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INTRODUCTION
A quality education is often seen as the potential equalizer in 
the pursuit of the “American Dream” between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots.” There is nary a sane person who would say that they 
stand against equal educational opportunities for all school children. 
Indeed, all fifty states have constitutional articles specifically 
addressing the states’ obligations to provide a public education.1 First 
through school desegregation and then school finance litigation, 
advocates have pursued equal educational opportunities in the courts 
for well over a century. This Article explores this quest, charting the 
challenges of school desegregation and school finance litigation and 
offers three potential considerations for school finance litigators, and 
the courts, that may help bring us closer to realizing the dream of 
equal educational opportunities of Brown v. Board, while bearing in 
mind that a more comprehensive approach is necessary to fully reach 
the promise of Brown of integration and opportunity.
The Article begins with a discussion of the 100-year school 
desegregation march to the Brown v. Board historic decision, from 
the lesser-known Roberts v. City of Boston decision to Mendez v.
Westminster. At the heart of these cases was the legal, social, and 
educational lesson that needed to be taught: segregating students on 
the basis of race in schoolhouses was not only “perhaps the most 
virulent form of this polity-threatening corruption,”2 but was also 
detrimental to the learning of students and to our greater society by 
denying equal educational opportunities. Our highest Court waited 
until 1954 in Brown v. Board3 to hold that the ill-conceived notion 
enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson and other cases—that segregating 
people on the basis of race was acceptable so long as equal services 
and facilities were available—bore no protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause.4 As former NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney 
Jack Greenberg described the Brown decision, “‘Brown led to the sit-
1. MOLLY A. HUNTER, REQUIRING STATES TO OFFER A QUALITY 




2. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School 
Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (1990). 
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896), overruled by Brown,
347 U.S. 483; see also infra Section I.A (discussing other cases upholding separate-
but-equal schools). 
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ins, the freedom marches . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . . If you 
look at Brown as . . . the icebreaker that broke up . . . that frozen sea, 
then you will see it was an unequivocal success.’”5 Brown also 
reminded the nation that there are limits to majoritarianism that the courts 
are obliged to . . . enforce in . . . the spirit and letter of the United States 
Constitution . . . [and] contributed to an unprecedented expansion of the 
American economy, consumer and tax base, created a more informed 
citizenry, and strengthened substantive democracy.6
Indeed, the success of Brown cannot reasonably be questioned 
when considering that it struck down as unconstitutional hundreds of 
policies and practices aimed specifically at excluding African-
American and, successively, other minority students from all-white 
schools.7 Before, a public school could tell a student: You cannot 
enter these doors because you are black, brown, Native American, 
Asian, or some other race or ethnicity. Today, that simply cannot 
occur because of the Brown decision. 
As the years passed, however, the courts often scaled back 
efforts to desegregate public schools. Indeed, many say the watering-
down effect of the Brown decision began the very next year when the 
Supreme Court announced in Brown II that responsible actors need 
only address the illegal segregation “with all deliberate speed.”8 Fifty 
years following the Brown decision, America should have been 
celebrating the ruling.9 Yet, while countless civil rights activists and 
various organizations and governmental entities held festivities to 
5. Ellis Cose, A Dream Deferred, WASH. POST (May 11, 2004, 4:43 PM) 
(alteration in original), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18184-
2004May11.html.
6. Lynn Huntley, Foreword to ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY: LESSONS 
FROM BROWN 3, 3 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2421 (2004) (“Brown rendered state-enforced ‘whites only’ 
public schools to little more than a painful relic of American history.”).
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see also, 
e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 131, 132 (2007).
9. There are some who believe that, perhaps, the “Euro-centric” public 
school system has harmed African-American students and that integration may not 
be the solution to opportunity and achievement. See, e.g., Danielle N. Boaz, Equality 
Does Not Mean Conformity: Reevaluating the Use of Segregated Schools to Create 
a Culturally Appropriate Education for African American Children, 7 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2007).
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honor the families, the advocates, and the decision, others reasonably 
questioned the lasting impact and relevance of Brown.10
Still, the importance of realizing equal educational 
opportunities for minority students remained with advocates and 
civil rights organizations. Saddled with de facto segregated schools, 
advocates turned their attention to federal and state courts to enforce 
constitutional rights to equitable educational opportunities between 
school districts. The movement eventually turned to addressing the 
adequacy of funding school districts at the state level.11 Some 
researchers criticize the justiciability of such claims, suggesting that 
the courts should stay out of the fray and allow legislators, policy 
makers, and voters to decide how to fund schools.12 At the same 
time, others suggest that adequacy cases are the only remaining type 
of education cases capable of rooting out inequalities in public
education, and thus, fulfilling the promise of equal educational 
10. See, e.g., Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting 
Brown v. Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political 
Perspective, 47 HOW. L.J. 627, 628 (2004) (discussing three different research 
camps on the influence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown); Heise, supra
note 7, at 2418; Jeannie Oakes & Martin Lipton, “Schools That Shock the 
Conscience”: Williams v. California and the Struggle for Education on Equal Terms 
Fifty Years After Brown, 15 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 25, 27 (2004) (“[A]lthough 
fifty years removed, Williams v. California provides sobering evidence that, while 
much has changed since Brown, the struggle for education on equal terms remains 
much the same.”).
11. This Article does not discuss the merits of common jurisdictional 
defenses argued by many state defendants, such as the lack of justiciable equity and 
adequacy claims. In the authors’ opinions, such last-ditch efforts by states are 
mounted only when their state legislatures or educational agencies are caught in a 
predicament in which they fail to fulfill their constitutional duties and merely ask the 
courts to withdraw themselves from judging whether those duties have been met. Cf. 
Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood V), 176 S.W.3d 
746, 780-81 (Tex. 2005) (noting that very few state courts have found school 
finance cases nonjusticiable and that the majority of courts do find such claims 
viable). As the United States Supreme Court stated in Baker v. Carr, “The doctrine 
of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’ The 
courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some 
action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.” 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962). To the authors, courts that reject adequacy or litigation cases often provide a 
political answer to a difficult, yet justiciable question.
12. See, e.g., William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 923, 926 (2011) (reviewing ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH,
SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-
ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009) and MICHAEL A.
REBELL, COURTS & KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE 
COURTS (2009)).
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opportunities for children of color in Brown v. Board.13 In fact, Mr. 
Hinojosa himself has probably been guilty of comparing the 
importance of adequacy litigation to that of Brown on at least one 
occasion. While there should be no question whether courts can 
appropriately rule on state constitutional adequacy claims,14 the 
question of whether adequacy cases have realized equitable 
opportunities for children of color and at-risk15 children on the whole 
remains elusive at best.16 Certainly, on the school segregation aspect 
of Brown, adequacy litigation has made no in roads to achieving 
desegregated schools, nor does it even claim to pursue such. 
Although one could plausibly argue that having adequate funding in 
transportation includes taking into account some of the costs related 
to magnet and diverse cluster schools, that issue is typically not 
raised. However, yielding equal educational opportunities for 
minority and at-risk children, especially in high-poverty schools, 
remains largely an aspirational goal, and one perhaps more important 
than ever before, given the increase in the number of minority and at-
13. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Education Adequacy, Democracy, and the 
Courts, in ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL 218, 218, 221
(Timothy Ready, Christopher Edley, Jr. & Catherine E. Snow eds., 2002).
14. For over two centuries, dating back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), the courts have been called upon to weigh the constitutionality 
of legislative acts. See Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923, 930 (Kan. 2005) 
(“Although the balance of power may be delicate, ever since Marbury v. Madison, it 
has been settled that the judiciary’s sworn duty includes judicial review of 
legislation for constitutional infirmity.” (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, a minority 
of state courts has refused to weigh the merits of equity and adequacy lawsuits, 
claiming such cases are nonjusticiable or violate the separation of powers. See, e.g.,
Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983) (“The 
quantity and quality of educational opportunities to be made available to the State’s 
public school children is a determination committed to the legislature . . . .”); 
Marrero v. Pennsylvania, 739 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1999) (adequacy funding questions 
“are exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly’s powers”); City of 
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995). This Article does not directly 
address those issues as the Article is premised, in part, on the need of the courts to 
intervene more appropriately in both school desegregation and school finance cases 
in order to secure equal educational opportunities for minority and at-risk students.
15. For purposes of this Article, “at-risk” refers to economically 
disadvantaged or low income and English language learner (ELL) students, unless 
otherwise indicated. The authors are well aware that this definition may be too 
narrow in some respects and too broad in other respects, but given the various 
definitions of “at-risk” across the states, the authors focus their writing on these two 
student groups. 
16. See, e.g., Combs & Combs, supra note 10, at 628 (discussing three 
different research camps on the influence of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown).
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risk students served in public schools across the United States 
coupled with the increase in high-stakes testing and accountability 
measures.
Today, with the ever-expanding and more rigorous 
standardized curriculum, testing, and accountability systems 
pervading public schools, the need to provide students, particularly 
at-risk and minority students, access to the educational opportunities 
necessary for the students to acquire the knowledge and skills to 
meet the standards imposed by state and the federal governments is 
perhaps greater than ever before. Even beyond those standards is the 
accompanying elusive mission of public schools to ensure that all 
students achieve their full potential and receive a well-rounded 
education that prepares them to enter college without remediation. 
The second part of the goal-oriented mission of public schools, 
college readiness, is perhaps even more important than the first 
because states can set very low academic standards.17
The argument, of course, is not to vary the standards between 
white and non-white students, wealthy and poor children, or 
property-wealthy and property-poor school districts. However, 
because all students are held to the same standards and all students 
should have the opportunity to reach their full potential, it seems 
reasonable that the courts should measure public school finance 
systems to ensure that at-risk and minority children can access the 
necessary educational resources they need to achieve success.18 And 
the courts can begin to do so by applying appropriate standards for 
an adequate education. Accordingly, the authors suggest that the 
courts, and advocates, should ensure that the adequacy standards 
applied in these school finance cases should not merely reflect state 
17. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance 
Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1248 (2008) (noting that in response to the No 
Child Left Behind Act, some states lowered their standards). The No Child Left 
Behind Act was signed into law on January 8, 2002, and was the reauthorization of 
the law formerly known as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002)).
18. See, e.g., Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New 
Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465 (1991). 
These additional, necessary educational resources may include high-quality pre-
kindergarten programs, reduced class sizes, quality bilingual and other supported 
language programs, and extended day and summer programs. See, e.g., Findings of 
Fact & Conclusions of Law at 92-102, Lobato v. State, No. 2005CV4794 (Colo. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (discussing educational needs of English Language Learner 
and low-income students). 
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standards, but must be scrutinized to ensure that the standards are 
high enough to ensure opportunities beyond a basic high school 
education. If courts continue to apply the lowest level of academic 
achievement when defining an “adequate education,” especially 
when applying minimal state accreditation standards or no standards 
at all, the courts will essentially gut the constitutional rights at stake 
and render them meaningless.
Second, adequacy lawsuits are often brought by a plethora of 
school districts and school children ranging widely in demographics 
and funding. While this may seem like a logical political maneuver 
to gather public support, evidence of success in higher-funded 
plaintiff districts enrolling few at-risk students may mask the real 
challenges high-poverty schools and at-risk students face, leaving 
courts uncertain how to receive and weigh evidence of achievement 
in determining adequacy claims. Therefore, the authors suggest that 
even before filing suit, advocates must come to terms on who will be 
the plaintiffs in order to make the strongest claims and other 
potential parties with more political, rather than legal, interests 
should consider not filing suit altogether.19
Equally important to school finance litigation itself are the 
remedies sought by litigants and the remedies ordered by the courts. 
If the claims and evidence demonstrate that certain students in
certain school districts are not obtaining an adequate education, the 
authors suggest that the prayers for relief should focus on those 
specific deficiencies. Instead, what often occurs is a presentation of 
evidence centered on the most at-risk students (oftentimes non-white 
students) and poorest school districts in the state, which is then 
followed with a request for a declaration that the entire school-
funding system be held constitutionally inadequate. When such a 
ruling issues, the legislative remedy often turns into a hugely 
political game, with the losers commonly being persons and 
organizations representing at-risk students. As a result, many of the 
cyclical problems with unequal educational opportunities and 
arbitrary, inadequate funding systems are never addressed. 
By the same token, the courts must ensure that their orders 
follow the evidence and claims in the cases. Courts have broad 
equitable powers, and if the evidence points to a group of students 
being harmed by the lack of access to adequate resources and 
opportunities, then an order should follow directing the responsible 
actors to rectify the wrong. And, the courts may want to consider 
19. See infra Section II.B.
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conducting fairness hearings to ensure that the legislative remedy 
matches the ordered relief. Otherwise, we will likely find ourselves 
in a revolving door of unequal opportunity.20
Lastly, we discuss a suggestion on how adequacy litigation—
knowing its limitation in not desegregating schools—may come 
closer to realizing Brown’s promise of equal opportunity. As school 
finance lawsuits have become the go-to litigation for equal 
educational advocates, if part of the promise of Brown is to ever be 
realized, advocates must seek more comprehensive claims beyond 
the traditional equity and adequacy claims. Such claims may include 
attacking ill-conceived reform measures such as accountability and 
teacher evaluation systems that drive quality teachers away from 
minority students and high-need schools. And if the courts have 
blocked access to the courts, the public must demand equal 
opportunity in state and national capitols and in their local districts 
both through legislation and, when necessary, by modifying their 
education clauses. 
But, as noted below, efforts to ensure that students of all races 
and ethnicities learn alongside one another and from one another 
should not cease because equitable and adequate resources and 
opportunities will only get us halfway there. Efforts must continue at 
the local, state, and federal levels to ensure that students attend 
diverse schools. For some, this may mean redefining local school 
boundaries, expanding magnet schools, or using socioeconomic 
status to assign students. This Article addresses only a snapshot of 
the systemic changes that can positively affect minority and at-risk 
student achievement and access, and much work will remain to be 
done in homes and classrooms across the country. While Brown
indeed operated as the icebreaker, it was, and remains, an unfulfilled 
promise, but one that the public can ill afford to abandon. 
I. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
A. Separate-but-“Equal” Schools
The general public often sees the Brown cases21 as the first 
cases challenging the racial segregation of students and educational 
20. See infra Subsection II.B.3.
21. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 n.1 (1954). Although the 
Brown v. Board of Education case is often highlighted as the seminal school case, it 
was merely one of four school desegregation cases consolidated for argument 
reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in 1953, the others being: Briggs v. Elliott (South 
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opportunity in public schools. However, one of the first reported 
cases complaining of an African-American student’s right to attend a 
school irrespective of race was Roberts v. City of Boston.22 In 1848, 
Sarah Roberts and her father, Benjamin Roberts, challenged the 
Boston Public Schools’ refusal to allow Sarah into an all-white
neighborhood school that was much closer to her home than either of 
the two all-black schools in the city.23 Not only was the all-white 
school closer to his home, but Mr. Roberts also complained of the 
quality and condition of the all-black school. Although the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution had yet to be 
adopted, Mr. Roberts’ attorneys developed claims grounded in equal 
treatment.24 They argued that no Massachusetts law authorized the 
City of Boston to segregate students on the basis of race, the 
Massachusetts Constitution required equal treatment of black 
students, and segregating students stigmatized the black students.25
Mr. Roberts further argued that the all-black schools were inferior to 
the quality of the all-white schools. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court, while conceding that black people “are entitled by law, in this 
commonwealth, to equal rights, constitutional and political, civil and 
social,”26 held that the City’s segregated schools were well within the 
discretionary judgment of the primary school committee.27 In 
response to the allegations of perceived prejudice, the court 
pronounced, “This prejudice, if it exists, is not created by law, and 
probably cannot be changed by law.”28
The Roberts opinion, upholding segregated schools on the basis 
of local control, resurfaced in other cases, including Plessy v. 
Ferguson.29 Although Plessy concerned whether a railroad company 
could have separate coaches for whites and non-whites, it based its 
Carolina); Davis v. County School Board (Virginia); and Gebhardt v. Belton
(Delaware). Id. 
22. 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198, 198 (1849).
23. Id. at 204-05. According to the record, the City created two all-black 
schools earlier in the 1800s at the request of African-American parents due to the 
prejudice their children faced in the schools. See id. at 199-200. 
24. Id. at 202-03. The statute under which Mr. Roberts brought his claim 
read, “[A]ny child, unlawfully excluded from public school instruction in this 
commonwealth, shall recover damages therefor against the city or town by which 
such public instruction is supported.” Id. at 198.
25. See id. at 201-02. 
26. Id. at 206.
27. Id. at 209.
28. Id.
29. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954).
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decision to authorize “separate but equal” coaches, in part, on the 
Roberts holding that cities could establish separate schools for 
students on the basis of race absent a law requiring otherwise.30
In turn, school and state officials and the courts used both the
Roberts and Plessy decisions to deny students of other non-white 
races access to white-only schools. In Gong Lum v. Rice, a parent of 
a U.S.-born citizen of Chinese descent challenged the segregation of 
Chinese students in Mississippi’s public schools.31 Relying on the 
Roberts and Plessy decisions, among others, the Supreme Court held, 
“The decision [to segregate Chinese students from white students] is 
within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools, and 
does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.”32
B. The Tide Begins to Turn
In the 1940s, the tide began to turn for advocates using the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a sword to strike down segregated 
schools, in spite of local discretionary decisions, and to invoke more 
effectively the stigmatizing effects of segregation. One of the first 
federal district court cases challenging the segregation in schools was 
Mendez v. Westminster.33
30. Id. at 544-45.
31. 275 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1927).
32. Id. at 86-87. The Gong Lum decision was perhaps more remarkable 
because the local school district did not have a separate school for Chinese or other 
non-white students. The Court sidestepped this issue, explaining that the plaintiff 
could have gone to a separate school for non-white students in another district, but 
that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue with the inconvenience of having to go to 
such a school outside the district. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
enforce the “separate but equal” mandate was further evidenced in its decision in 
Cummings v. County Board of Education, where it found that a Georgia school 
district’s decision to close an all-black high school, while supporting an all-white 
high school for girls, was not unconstitutional. See 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). The 
Court reasoned that the local board’s actions were justified because the board 
decided to use local, limited funds to operate all-black primary schools for the three-
hundred young black students, rather than keep open the all-black high school for 
the sixty black students. See id. at 544-45. The Court concluded that local-taxation 
issues were a matter for the states and that “any interference on the part of Federal 
authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case 
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the 
land.” Id. at 545. 
33. Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 545 (S.D. Cal. 
1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). Although Mendez is thought of as the 
first school segregation lawsuit brought by Mexican-American students and parents, 
in the 1920s and 1930s suits challenging the establishment of separate Mexican 
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Historically, school districts throughout the Southwest placed 
Mexican-American and Latino students in inferior “Mexican 
schools.”34 These sub-standard school buildings often were 
insufficiently resourced and poorly equipped.35 Furthermore, school 
districts paid the Mexican schoolteachers less compared to the 
teachers at the Anglo schools and hired novice teachers at the 
Mexican schools or incompetent teachers who had been banned from 
the Anglo schools.36 On March 2, 1945, Gonzalo Mendez and other 
Mexican American and Latino parents filed suit in a California 
Federal District Court against Westminster School District, Santa 
Ana School District, and others, seeking to enjoin school officials 
from segregating their children in “Mexican schools.”37 The Mendez
plaintiffs argued first that California law did not authorize the 
segregation of Mexican-American or Latino students, unlike Native 
American and Asian-American students.38 Second, they argued that 
schools were brought in Arizona, California, and Texas. See JAMES A. FERG-
CADIMA, MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, BLACK, WHITE AND BROWN:
LATINO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION EFFORTS IN THE PRE- AND POST-BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION ERA 14 (2004), available at
http://inpathways.net/LatinoDesegregationPaper2004.pdf. In Romo v. Laird, a state 
court upheld the Tempe School District’s creation of separate schools for Mexican-
American students for pedagogical reasons, such as speaking Spanish, as long as the 
children’s educational opportunities were “equal.” Id. at 35 app. A (citing Romo v. 
Laird, No. 21617, slip op. at 5-6 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. 1925)). Although the 
court held that the Mexican school was unequal because it lacked similar certified 
teachers as the white-only schools and ordered the integration of the students, the 
school district responded by assigning certified teachers to the Mexican schools, 
thus continuing the segregation. Id. In Texas, the Court of Appeals held that San 
Felipe School District “school authorities have no power to arbitrarily segregate 
Mexican children, assign them to separate schools, and exclude them from schools 
maintained for children of other white races, merely or solely because they are 
Mexicans,” but allowed the segregation to stand. Id. at 36 app. B (quoting Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)). And in 
California, a San Diego Superior Court judge struck down an “Americanization” 
school established specifically for educating Mexican-American students by the 
Lemon Grove School Board, finding that California law did not permit such. See id.
at 39 app. C (citing Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66625 (San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct. Apr. 
17, 1931)) (the “Lemon Grove Incident”). 
34. See, e.g., Thomas A. Saenz, Mendez and the Legacy of Brown: A 
Latino Civil Rights Lawyer’s Assessment, 15 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 67, 67 (2004).
35. See GILBERT G. GONZALEZ, CHICANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF 
SEGREGATION 22 (1990).
36. Id.
37. Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 545; see also Frederick P. Aguirre et al., 
Mendez v. Westminster: A Living History, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 401.
38. Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 545.
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segregating students in “Mexican schools” stigmatized those children 
to a degree that harmed the children educationally and violated the 
rights of children to the equal protection of the law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.39
The defendant districts argued that the federal courts had no 
jurisdiction over a state matter and that the segregation was based on 
educational needs, such as special instructional techniques to learn 
English and the American culture.40 The defendants also relied on 
Plessy v. Ferguson, arguing that segregation on the basis of race or 
national origin was constitutional as long as the districts maintained 
separate-but-equal facilities.41 On February 18, 1946, Judge Paul J. 
McCormick issued an injunction enjoining the segregation of 
Mexican schoolchildren, holding: 
‘The equal protection of the laws’ pertaining to the public school system 
in California is not provided by furnishing in separate schools the same 
technical facilities, text books and courses of instruction to children of 
Mexican ancestry that are available to the other public school children 
regardless of their ancestry. A paramount requisite in the American system 
of public education is social equality. It must be open to all children by 
unified school association regardless of lineage.42
While Judge McCormick found that California law did not 
authorize the segregation of students of Mexican or Latin American
descent, his decision also challenged implicitly the holdings in 
Roberts, Plessy, and Cummings, criticizing the “separate but equal” 
standard and denouncing local discretionary decisions that 
segregated students on the basis of race or ancestry by holding 
similar actions by the Westminster defendants in violation of the 
equal protection rights of Latino students under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court also provided further 
substance and guidance to the segregation of ELL students, stating 
that although credible examinations of students’ English proficiency 
may allow for temporary, specially designed pedagogical programs 
for those students, they “do not justify the general and continuous 
segregation in separate schools of the children of Mexican ancestry 
from the rest of the elementary school population.”43 On appeal, the 
39. Id. at 545-46.
40. Id. at 546.
41. Id. at 550 & n.7.
42. Id. at 549.
43. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 8, Mendez, 64 F. Supp. 544 
(No. 4292-M Civ.), available at http://mendezetalvwestminster.com/pdf/
Findings%20of%20Fact%20and%20Conclusions%20of%20Law.pdf.
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Ninth Circuit unanimously upheld the decision.44 At first glance, the 
decision may appear to upend the precedents established in Plessy,
Cummings, and Gong Lum, and indeed, the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (LDF) filed an amicus brief urging the Court to overturn 
Plessy.45 However, the Court explained that those holdings did not 
apply in Mendez primarily because no California law allowed the 
segregation of Latino students and none of those cases ever held that 
public entities could discriminate within a race; because Latinos 
were of the “white” race, those cases allowing segregation between 
the races did not apply.46
C. Brown v. Board Arrives
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the seminal civil rights 
education cases, consolidated in Brown v. Board.47 Unlike the prior 
school desegregation cases that were tried with very specific relief 
tied to the plaintiffs’ demands, including Mendez, Gong Lum, and 
Roberts, the Brown cases were part of a much larger, refined attack 
developed by the NAACP LDF and its partners aimed ultimately at 
overturning Plessy.48 Plaintiff children and their parents in four 
different school districts around the country filed lawsuits seeking 
equal educational opportunities and a reversal of Plessy’s “separate 
but equal” application to public schools at the primary and secondary 
levels. The Briggs plaintiffs filed their lawsuit initially asking for a 
bus for its African-American students (many who had to walk eight 
miles to the nearest all-black school), equivalent facilities, and 
44. Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947) 
(“By enforcing the segregation of school children of Mexican descent against their 
will and contrary to the laws of California, respondents have violated the federal law 
as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by depriving 
them of liberty and property without due process of law and by denying to them the 
equal protection of the laws.”).
45. See Saenz, supra note 34, at 68.
46. Id. at 69 (noting that California state law did not authorize the 
segregation acts of the districts and discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “the 
practiced segregation was not between ‘children of parents belonging to one or 
another of the great races of mankind’” (quoting Mendez, 161 F.2d at 780)). In 
response, the California legislature repealed the law authorizing the segregation of 
Native American and Asian-American students, rather than amending it to add 
Latinos. See Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and 
Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 168 (2005).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. See Saenz, supra note 34, at 68.
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curricula under the “separate but equal” doctrine.49 When the 
Clarendon County School District rebuffed the demands, the 
plaintiffs filed suit with the help of the NAACP and the LDF and 
later amended their complaint to attack segregation head on.50 Two 
judges on the three-judge panel hearing Briggs initially found that 
the school district violated the rights of African-American school 
children to “separate but equal” facilities and ordered the district to 
provide such but refused to overturn Plessy.51 In a powerful dissent 
that foretold a ruling yet to come, Judge Waring stated, “Segregation 
is per se inequality.”52
The plaintiffs in the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton,
similarly challenged the provision of unequal educational 
opportunities through curricula offerings, conditions of facilities, 
49. Briggs v. Elliott (South Carolina), LEADERSHIP CONF.,
http://www.civilrights.org/education/brown/briggs.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
50. Reportedly, federal district court Judge Julius Waties Waring, who sat 
on the three-judge panel hearing the Briggs case, urged then-LDF attorney Thurgood 
Marshall to broaden his complaint and attack Plessy outright. See ELLIS COSE,
BEYOND BROWN V. BOARD: THE FINAL BATTLE FOR EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 22 (2004). Like Briggs, the plaintiffs in Brown argued that their school 
district offered inferior opportunities, including facilities, curricula, teaching 
resources, and student personnel services, and that segregation engendered unequal 
opportunities. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 797-98 (D. Kan. 1951), 
rev’d, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The district court concluded that the facilities and other 
opportunities in the all-black schools were comparable to those in the all-white 
schools and that both the Plessy and Gong Lum cases disposed of plaintiffs’ attack 
against the “separate but equal” doctrine. Id. at 798-800; see also Davis v. Cnty. 
Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337, 339-41 (E.D. Va. 1952) (holding segregation 
constitutional but ordering the district to provide equality in buildings, facilities, 
curricula, and transportation), rev’d sub nom. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
51. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 537-38 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (holding that 
“[t]he court should not use its power to abolish segregation in a state where it is 
required by law if the equality demanded by the Constitution can be attained 
otherwise” but should instead rectify the inequalities by directing the responsible 
actors to do so), vacated, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
52. Id. at 548 (Waring, J., dissenting). In calling on the courts to address 
directly the racial segregation claim, Judge Waring pronounced: 
If they are entitled to any rights as American citizens, they are entitled to 
have these rights now and not in the future. And no excuse can be made to 
deny them these rights which are theirs under the Constitution and laws of 
America by the use of the false doctrine and patter called “separate but 
equal” and it is the duty of the Court to meet these issues simply and 
factually and without fear, sophistry and evasion.
Id. at 540. The Briggs Court held in a later hearing that the district was making 
sufficient progress in equalizing resources and held steadfast to its decision not to 
reverse Plessy. Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920, 921-23 (E.D.S.C. 1952), rev’d 
sub nom. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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class sizes, and several others, as well as the segregated schools 
themselves.53 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s holding that segregated facilities, in and of themselves, did 
not violate the equal protection rights of African-American 
students.54 The court did find that many of the educational 
opportunities offered by the two subject school districts were 
unequal between the all-black and all-white schools. But unlike the 
South Carolina and Virginia federal courts that allowed the school 
districts in those cases time to equalize deficient opportunities, the 
Delaware Supreme Court ordered the two defendant school districts 
to allow the African-American students admission without delay, 
though the defendants then applied for a writ of certiorari, which was 
granted.55
At the time the four Brown cases reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Court acknowledged that the provision of equalizing 
resources between the segregated schools was achieved, or was in 
the works, in each of the cases before it.56 Accordingly, the Court 
turned to the question whether it should consider the effects of 
segregation on public schools in determining the equal protection 
claims.57 The Court first examined the role of public education in 
1954 and its relationship to opportunity, noting that 
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments[;] . . . the very foundation of good citizenship[;] . . . a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values. . . . In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.58
The Court next examined the evidence and argument related to 
the question of whether the segregation itself, even with equal 
facilities and the like, deprives minority school children of equal 
educational opportunities. After noting some of the psychological 
and sociological evidence, as well as findings by the Delaware and 
Kansas lower courts and rulings in the Supreme Court’s higher 
education-access cases, the Court held, 
53. 91 A.2d 137, 139-41 (Del. 1952), aff’d sub nom. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954).
54. Id. at 140-44.
55. Id. at 148-49, 152.
56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 & n.9.
57. Id. at 492.
58. Id. at 493. 
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[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has 
no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, 
we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the 
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.59
To say the least, it was a profound decision, the effect of which 
rippled across the country. African-American students, parents, 
educators and advocates from all over celebrated the demise of the 
“separate but equal” doctrine. However, only half of the battle was 
won. Many segregated schools refused to open their doors the very 
next school day. The next important question for the Court was, 
“What now?” In order to address the remedial phase, the Supreme 
Court asked the parties to address outstanding questions of how the 
courts could enforce the mandate.60
D. Enter Brown II
As stark of a struggle as it was to achieve the Brown ruling, it 
proved even more difficult enforcing it. Some school district and 
state officials reported to the Supreme Court in 1955 that they were 
already undergoing efforts to desegregate their schools without 
waiting for a ruling on the remedy phase from the Court.61 However, 
others, like those in Virginia and South Carolina, awaited further 
guidance from the Supreme Court.62 The Court’s decision in Brown 
59. Id. at 488, 494-95.
60. Id. at 494 n.13 (“4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public 
schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment (a) would a decree necessarily follow 
providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro 
children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or (b) may this 
Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to 
be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color 
distinctions? 5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and 
assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described 
in question 4(b), (a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; (b)
if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach; (c) should this Court appoint a 
special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for 
such decrees; (d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with 
directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should 
the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first 
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
61. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (identifying the District of 
Columbia, Kansas, and Delaware among those enacting desegregation plans).
62. Id. 
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II turned out not to be the hammer that equal-opportunity advocates 
expected from the Warren Court and helped curtail any immediate 
need to desegregate the schools.
The Court required that actors responsible for segregation 
allow public students entry into the schools “with all deliberate 
speed” but gave school districts and states no specific timetable and 
required the lower courts charged with enforcing school 
desegregation to be “flexible” and balance the needs between the 
public and private.63 The Court’s call to desegregate schools was not 
realized in some places until years later as school districts refused to 
integrate the minority children with white children. Despite the 
“end” of racial segregation in public schools, Clarendon County’s 
black children did not step into all-white schools until twelve years 
later and by that time, many white parents had placed their children 
in private schools.64 In Little Rock, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
called out the 101st Airborne to enforce the Brown mandate.65 While 
some places resisted Brown by enacting school-choice plans, rigging 
school boundaries, and committing other acts intended not to 
integrate schools, officials in Prince Edward County of Virginia 
decided in 1959 to close doors to their schools altogether.66 For five 
years, the district locked the gates of all of its public schools in lieu 
63. Id. at 300-01; see also COSE, supra note 50, at 7. But see Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 7, 12, 16 (1958) (rejecting the Little Rock School Board’s 
request to delay full implementation of its school desegregation plan based on chaos 
and hostility in the schools, asserting that its “all deliberate speed” mandate meant 
“that delay in any guise in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro children 
could not be countenanced, and that only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly 
pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public schools could constitute 
good faith compliance. State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort 
toward initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial 
discrimination in the public school system. . . . Thus law and order are not here to be 
preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights.”).
64. Briggs v. Elliott (South Carolina), supra note 49.
65. Little Rock School Desegregation (1957), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_little_rock_school_de
segregation_1957/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
66. See Massive Resistance, VA. HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-
explorer/civil-rights-movement-virginia/massive (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) 
(describing the “Southern Manifesto,” which laid out the opposition to integrated 
schools and was signed by more than one hundred southern officeholders in 1956); 
see also Leslie “Skip” Griffin Jr., Brown at 60 and Milliken at 40, HARV. ED. MAG.,
Summer 2014, available at http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/14/06/brown-60-
milliken-40.
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of integrating their schools, forcing African-American families to 
move outside the county, send their children away to schools in other 
states, or cease educating their children altogether.67
Complications in desegregating schools also arose in 
desegregation cases involving Latino students. In Mendez and other 
cases, Latinos typically argued in school desegregation cases that 
they were “white” for racial classification purposes, and state laws 
did not allow for their segregation.68 This approach impeded 
desegregation in some districts, which, under the Brown mandate to 
integrate African-American with white students, integrated the 
African-American students with Latino—but not white—students, 
arguing that such was permissible.69 The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hernandez v. Texas should have helped shed light on how 
integrating black and Latino students was not permissible. In 
Hernandez, a Mexican-American convicted of murder claimed that 
Jackson County, Texas violated his equal protection rights under the 
U.S. Constitution by denying qualified Mexican-Americans access to 
the jury rolls.70 The Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause was not designed solely to address the black–white paradigm 
but also to protect separate classes targeted for discrimination. Thus, 
while the courts often recognized Latinos as part of the “white” race, 
for equal protection purposes they were deemed a separate class 
because of the historical discrimination imposed against Mexican-
Americans.71 Nevertheless, some school districts persisted in 
67. Griffin, supra note 66.
68. Saenz, supra note 34, at 69-70; see also Johnson, supra note 46, at 172
(“Mexican Americans at times claimed to be ‘white’ to avoid the discrimination 
suffered by African Americans and to accrue the benefits of whiteness secured by 
law.”).
69. FERG-CADIMA, supra note 33, at 26 (citing NAT’L INST. OF EDUC.,
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATION CONCERNS OF THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY 11
(1977) (transcribing observations of Dr. José Cárdenas, Director, Intercultural 
Development Research Association)).
70. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1954). For an excellent 
history of the factual and legal analysis of the Hernandez case, see “COLORED MEN”
AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”: HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN-
AMERICAN LAWYERING (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006).
71. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479-80 (“At least one restaurant in town 
prominently displayed a sign announcing ‘No Mexicans Served.’ On the courthouse 
grounds at the time of the hearing, there were two men’s toilets, one unmarked, and 
the other marked ‘Colored Men’ and ‘Hombres Aqui’ (‘Men Here’).”). It should be 
noted that Gus Garcia, Carlos Cadena, and John Herrera, attorneys for Mr. 
Hernandez, used the segregated restroom marked “Hombres Aqui” during the trial. 
See A CLASS APART (PBS Home Video 2009). It should be further noted that the 
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assigning black and Latino students to the same schools, but not 
integrating white students.
One of the first federal court of appeals cases to address school 
district practices of assigning African-American students to 
predominantly Mexican-American schools was Cisneros v. Corpus 
Christi Independent School District.72 There, the school district drew 
school boundaries, among several other discriminatory practices, to 
ensure white students largely remained in separate schools but 
integrated Mexican-American and African-American students in 
other schools.73 The Fifth Circuit held the school district’s actions 
unconstitutional.74 In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Keyes v. School District No. 1 put to rest the question of whether 
school districts could achieve the mandate of Brown by integrating
African-American students with Latino, but not white, students.75
The Supreme Court held that although it had previously identified 
Latinos as a separate class for equal protection purposes, the lower 
district court erred by failing to combine the Latino and African-
American student populations for purposes of defining a 
“‘segregated’ school” in Denver.76
The Supreme Court eventually adopted stronger mandates to 
ensure that schools desegregated pursuant to Brown. For example, 
the Supreme Court struck down freedom-of-choice plans that tended 
to perpetuate segregated schools and required school districts to take 
affirmative action to integrate the schools and required districts to 
develop plans that would work now.77 Lower courts turned to 
evaluating not only student demographics but also non-exhaustive 
program areas in order to determine whether vestiges of 
discrimination remained, including student enrollment, faculty hiring 
Hernandez decision was not seen by some to be as far-reaching as promised because 
the Supreme Court’s decision required Latino litigants to prove that they were 
discriminated against “in a particular local community.” Saenz, supra note 34, at 72 
n.32; cf. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973); 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(concluding that Latinos are a separate class without demonstration of proof of 
discrimination in a particular community). 
72. 467 F.2d 142.
73. Id. at 149. 
74. Id. at 148-49.
75. 413 U.S. at 196-97.
76. Id. at 197. The Court reasoned its decision on the fact that Latinos 
(“Hispanos” is used in Court’s opinion) and African-Americans had experienced 
much of the same discrimination and unequal education, as found in two reports 
centered on Hispanos in the Southwest. Id. at 197-98.
77. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968).
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and assignments, facilities, curriculum, and extracurricular 
programs.78 The burden shifted to school districts to explain away 
continuing racial imbalances and encouraged school districts to 
consider redrawing school-attendance boundaries and bussing 
students to desegregate schools.79 With the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, these court rulings eventually led to 79% of 
African-American students in the South attending integrated schools 
by 1970, up from just 16% four years earlier.80
But for those intent on realizing the dream of Brown, a change 
in the Supreme Court’s composition brought about a change in the 
direction of effectuating the mandate to desegregate schools. In 
1974, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley reversed a lower court 
decision ordering the bussing of Detroit school children to 
surrounding suburban school districts.81 Two years later in Pasadena 
City Board of Education v. Spangler, the Supreme Court limited a 
district court’s power to modify a school-assignment plan despite the 
racial imbalances noted one year after implementation.82 In Dowell,
the Supreme Court relaxed its standard for lifting an injunction when 
applied to school desegregation cases, requiring that school districts 
need only comply in good faith with the desegregation plan and 
eliminate vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable.83 In 
1993, the Supreme Court again sought to return control to local 
school districts authorizing courts to relinquish partial control over 
areas of school operation in which the districts have fully complied.84
After witnessing a decline in school desegregation into the 
1990s, America’s public schools have experienced a growth in 
78. See id. at 435. These program areas came to be known as the “Green
factors.” See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 467 (1992).
79. See Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26-30
(1971).
80. Photograph of Little Rock Central High School National Historic Site 
Museum Exhibit: Beyond Central High School (on file with author).
81. 418 U.S. 717, 757 (1974); see also Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy 
for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC.
CHANGE 47, 50 (2009).
82. 427 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1976).
83. Daniel J. McMullen & Irene Hirata McMullen, Stubborn Facts of 
History—The Vestiges of Past Discrimination in School Desegregation Cases, 44 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75, 79-80 (1993). But see Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 
237, 246-50 (1991) (disputing the contention that the Court was changing its 
standard for withdrawing injunctive relief).
84. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992).
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segregation for African-American and Latino children.85 This has 
occurred due to a number of reasons, including: the changing of the 
legal standards for enforcing the Brown mandate over time; the 
growing reluctance of the courts and the federal government to 
enforce outstanding school desegregation decrees; the sanctioning of 
de facto segregation; housing patterns; school site selections; the 
high legal threshold required to prove intentional discrimination; the 
success of reverse-discrimination claimants; and federal, state, and 
local leaders’ lack of will to ensure diverse schools and equal 
opportunities, among others.86
While school desegregation cases continue, and the mandate to 
desegregate remains enforceable sixty years following Brown,87
advocates in search of ensuring equal educational opportunities for 
all students turned to school finance litigation over the years in both 
federal and state court.88
85. COSE, supra note 50, at 10 (citing GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEI,
BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? 4 (2004), available at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/brown-at-50-king2019s-dream-or-plessy2019s-nightmare/orfield-brown-
50-2004.pdf); see also ERICA FRANKENBERG, CHUNGMEI LEI & GARY ORFIELD, A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM?
4-6 (2003), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/a-multiracial-society-with-segregated-schools-
are-we-losing-the-dream/frankenberg-multiracial-society-losing-the-dream.pdf;
Liebman, supra note 2, at 1465-66 (noting that even with the soft enforcement of 
desegregation decrees by the Bush and Reagan administrations, segregated schools 
declined).
86. See, e.g., Bowman supra note 81, at 49-50; see also Robert L. Carter, 
50 Years of Brown, in ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY: LESSONS FROM BROWN, supra 
note 6, at 5, 7 (noting the factors impacting the influence of Brown including 
demographic factors, housing patterns, and site-selection policies). 
87. See, e.g., Fisher v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1143-44 
(9th Cir. 2011) (reversing the lower court’s declaration of unitary status due to an 
evidentiary record replete with evidence showing the school district’s lack of good 
faith compliance); see also Fifth Circuit Refuses to Dismiss Longstanding School 
Desegregation Case in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND
(June 24, 2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/update/fifth-circuit-refuses-dismiss-
longstanding-desegregation-case-st-martin-parish-louisiana (discussing the case and 
also fact that the NAACP LDF currently has 100 school desegregation cases on its 
docket).
88. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 252 
(1999) (“School finance litigation is . . . often depicted both as a means of moving 
beyond race as the salient issue in education reform and as an effective way to 
achieve educational equity and adequacy for disadvantaged students from all racial 
and ethnic backgrounds.”). Other areas of education law litigated to ensure 
substantial reforms and equal educational opportunities—not discussed in this 
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II. THE ADVENT OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
A. Equity Cases
Over the past forty-five years and counting, public-education 
advocates have filed several actions in courts seeking equitable and 
adequate resources for all school children, lending credence to the 
mission of Brown.89 In describing the history of school finance 
litigation, researchers typically describe school finance litigation in 
terms of “waves.” The “first wave”90 entails federal claims filed 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Article—include enforcement of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 
§ 1703(f), which requires that states and local education agencies take appropriate 
action to ensure that ELL students have access to quality language programs 
implemented with the necessary resources so that the students can “overcome [their] 
language barriers” and enforcement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act, which ensures services to children with disabilities and governs how states and 
local education agencies provide intervention and services to students with 
disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006); id. § 1400(d).
89. Despite the complimentary goals of securing equal educational 
opportunities for school children of color and of poverty, advocates in school 
desegregation cases have often failed to collaborate on joint efforts on school 
finance advocates. Bowman, supra note 81, at 53-56. This may be due to the fact 
that school-desegregation advocates see school finance supporters as essentially 
arguing for separate-but-equal, or separate-but-adequate, schools. See, e.g., Oakes & 
Lipton, supra note 10, at 25-26 (comparing the arguments for equal educational 
tools essential for a fundamental education in the school finance case, Williams v. 
California, to the arguments of school desegregation lawyers in the era of separate 
but equal). This may also occur because some actors in school finance cases, as well 
as school-desegregation litigators, fail to see school finance as a civil rights issue; or 
because school finance advocates often must “accept and ignore” segregated 
schools, which detracts attention away from desegregating and integrating schools. 
Cf. Greg Winter, 50 Years After Brown, the Issue Is Often Money, N.Y. TIMES (May 
17, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/17/education/17BROW.html (quoting 
Brown attorney Jack Greenberg as discounting financing cases as not being adequate 
and that “‘[i]ntegration is the only way to do that;’” and quoting Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity’s school finance attorney Michael Rebell as countering that “‘[t]he 
fact that school districts remain very separate is a reality that the Supreme Court has 
allowed. . . . This is the world we’re living in.’”). MALDEF is one of the very few 
organizations to combat lack of equal educational opportunities using state 
constitutional clauses for school finance cases, Title VI and the Fourteenth 
Amendment for school desegregation cases, and the Equal Educational 
Opportunities Act of 1974 for language discrimination. See FERG-CADIMA, supra
note 33, at 29-30.
90. The authors are unsure if this description as a “first wave” is accurate 
because only a handful of cases were filed in federal court during this era, and those 
ceased—in large part—in 1973, following the Rodriguez decision. 
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typically begins with a discussion of the Rodriguez v. San Antonio 
Independent School District case.91 Although a handful of other cases 
were filed before Rodriguez,92 undoubtedly it is the seminal federal 
school finance case. 
Rodriguez began as a student protest in 1968, when 
approximately 400 students attending Edgewood High School on the 
impoverished, but prideful, west side of San Antonio, Texas walked 
out of school protesting the quality of education and the condition of 
their school.93 The mostly Mexican-American students drafted a list 
of demands, asking for qualified teachers, higher-level academic 
courses, auditing of school district expenditures, stricter discipline, 
and adequate teaching facilities.94 Several weeks later, Mr. Demetrio 
Rodriguez and other Edgewood parents filed suit challenging 
Texas’s unequal school finance system under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.95
The evidence of inequalities was largely irrefutable. In a survey 
of 110 school districts in Texas, the ten wealthiest districts with 
property values above $100,000 per pupil received $585 per pupil for 
a property tax of only $0.31.96 The students in the four poorest 
districts with property values below $10,000 per pupil received only 
$60 per pupil—despite taxing their residents at a rate nearly 250% 
higher: $0.70.97 The groups of districts also differed along racial 
lines: the ten wealthiest districts enrolled 8% minority students 
compared to 79% in the poorest districts.98 The lack of resources 
91. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 17, at 1229.
92. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 13, at 224 (citing McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 
F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (arguing that the Illinois school-funding system’s 
minimum foundational funding was inadequate for disadvantaged urban students)).
93. The number of students and protestors was estimated between 300 and 
3,000. See, e.g., Cynthia E. Orozco, Rodriguez v. San Antonio ISD, TEX. ST. HIST.
ASS’N, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/jrrht (last visited Oct. 23, 
2014) (estimating 400 protestors); Ron White, 3000 Ask Reforms in Walkout, SAN 
ANTONIO LIGHT, May 16, 1968, at 1 (estimating 3,000 protestors); Doris Wright, 
Edgewood Students Protest, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, May 17, 1968, at 1A 
(estimating 300 protestors). Portions of this Section were excerpted from DAVID 
HINOJOSA, RODRIGUEZ V. SAN ANTONIO ISD: 40 YEARS LATER (forthcoming 2015).
94. Wright, supra note 93, at 12A. The students carried signs, including 
some stating: “Better Education Now Not Tomorrow” and “We Want a Gym, Not a 
Barn.” Id.; White, supra note 93, at 4.
95. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 
(W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam), rev’d, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. Id. at 282.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 282 n.3.
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caused high-minority, property-poor districts like Edgewood to 
struggle in recruiting and retaining qualified teachers.99
Following trial, the three-judge panel issued its decision, 
finding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional and relying 
partly on Brown, held that education was a fundamental right under 
the U.S. Constitution.100 But the victory was short-lived. On March 
21, 1973, in a five-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the 
lower-court opinion.101 Although the Court agreed with the lower 
court that “‘the grave significance of education both to the individual 
and to our society’ cannot be doubted,” the Court refused to hold that 
the importance of education elevated it to a fundamental right, 
concluding that education was neither explicitly nor implicitly a right 
guaranteed under the Constitution.102 Relying once again on “local 
control,” in applying rational basis to the Texas system, the Court 
found the grossly inequitable system passed constitutional muster.103
In a stinging dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall berated the majority 
for retreating from the foundation of Brown and suggested that the 
plaintiffs turn to state courts for recourse.104
The “second wave” of school finance litigation included other 
state actions already filed, or that soon followed, asserting similar 
equity claims but, as Justice Marshall suggested, under state 
constitutional equal protection and education clauses.105 At the center 
of the claims in these cases was the unequal educational 
opportunities afforded to students based on where they lived and 
where they went to school, which stemmed from school finance 
systems allocating disparate resources based on lower property 
values. While race was not central to many of the claims, because 
many minority students lived in the lower-property-wealth districts, 
minorities were often impacted disparately by inequitable funding 
systems. 
In California, students and parents sued in state court under 
both the United States Constitution and California constitution in 
99. JOSÉ A CÁRDENAS, TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: AN IDRA
PERSPECTIVE 9 (1997) (noting that in 1969, less than half of Edgewood’s teachers 
met minimum certification requirements and the teacher turnover rate was 33%).
100. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 281-82.
101. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6.
102. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriquez, 337 F. Supp. at 283).
103. Id. at 50-51.
104. Id. at 71-72, 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. See Ryan, supra note 17, at 1229. Plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest 
(Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), asserted both state and federal constitutional 
claims. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1976).
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1968, challenging the grossly inequitable California school finance 
system that also relied on disparate property values and property-tax 
rates.106 Following Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court revisited 
its decision in Serrano I and pronounced once again that, under the 
California constitution, education was a fundamental right.107 The 
court ultimately struck down the California school finance system as 
unconstitutional.108 However, voters in property-wealthy districts 
retaliated and passed an initiative that capped raises on property 
taxes; consequently, the legislature was forced to level down 
resources allocated for public education.109
Similarly, in New Jersey, plaintiffs filed suit challenging the 
school-funding inequities under the state constitution, requiring a 
“thorough and efficient system of free public schools.”110 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court ultimately found the system unconstitutional 
after determining that the state failed to “fulfill[] its obligation to 
afford all pupils that level of instructional opportunity which is
comprehended by a thorough and efficient system of education for 
students,” as required under the state constitution.111 In separate 
litigation filed in 1981, Abbott v. Burke, plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of the New Jersey school-funding system because of 
the significant disparities in expenditures between poor urban school 
districts and wealthy suburban districts, and the lack of adequate 
funds.112
Other state courts upheld similar equity challenges in the early 
years following Rodriguez, including challenges in Arkansas, 
Connecticut, and Wyoming.113 The relatively simple notion behind 
these complex equity cases was captured well by the Vermont 
Supreme Court when it held, “Money is clearly not the only variable 
affecting educational opportunity, but it is one that government can 
effectively equalize.”114 The success of these state equity cases 
slowed in the 1980s with fifteen courts denying challenges up to that 
106. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1244.
107. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951.
108. See id. at 957-58.
109. Rebell, supra note 13, at 227.
110. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, para. 1.
111. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973).
112. The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CENTER,
http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2014).
113. Rebell, supra note 13, at 226.
114. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997).
600 Michigan State Law Review 2014:575
period, many relying on similar reasoning found in Rodriguez,115 but 
the pendulum again swung back in favor of the plaintiffs in the late 
1980s.116 In Texas, property-poor school districts, including 
Edgewood Independent School District (ISD), and parents, including 
Demetrio Rodriguez, again challenged the inequities in the Texas 
school finance system. This time, they won, with the Supreme Court 
of Texas holding in 1989 that the state’s education clause requires 
that “[c]hildren who live in poor districts and children who live in 
rich districts . . . be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have 
access to educational funds.”117 Like the advantages built-in for the 
former all-white districts in Brown, the Edgewood Court noted that 
the Texas school finance system favored high-wealth districts, 
allowing those districts, “to provide . . . their students broader 
educational experiences including more extensive curricula, more 
up-to-date technological equipment, better libraries and library 
personnel, teacher aides, counseling services, lower student-teacher 
ratios, better facilities, parental involvement programs, and drop-out 
prevention programs. They are also better able to attract and retain 
experienced teachers and administrators.”118
In Wyoming, the state supreme court found several educational 
inequalities favoring the high-spending wealthy districts, such as 
more and better-equipped science and computer labs, larger and 
newer book and audio-visual collections, stronger gifted and talented 
programs, and a more expansive curriculum, among several other 
115. Rebell, supra note 13, at 227; see also Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. 
State (USD 229), 885 P.2d 1170, 1184-85 (Kan. 1994) (citing twelve state court 
opinions rejecting equity claims).
116. It has been reported that the “adequacy” movement overtook the 
“equity” movement in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 13, at 228. 
However, this statement is not entirely accurate. Many of the cases termed 
“adequacy” cases were more like “equity” cases because fundamental to the claims 
and evidence at issue in many of those cases was the disparate access to resources 
between school districts. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 
I), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (holding that students in all school districts 
must have substantially equal access to similar revenue at similar tax effort—a
ruling based on equity); see also Ryan, supra note 17, at 1236-37 (describing the 
evidence and analysis of unequal educational opportunities in “adequacy” cases, 
including those in Montana, Texas, Tennessee, Arizona, New Jersey, Arkansas, and 
Vermont). As Ryan notes, “The mislabeling of some cases, moreover, has given the 
false impression that almost all school finance decisions since 1989 have been about 
adequacy as opposed to equity.” Id.
117. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
118. Id. at 393.
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advantages.119 The court ultimately held the school system in 
violation of the state constitution’s education clause, stating in part 
“that the spending disparities among the State’s school districts 
translate into a denial of equality of educational opportunity.”120
Like their predecessor cases, the courts found the large 
disparities in access to educational resources unacceptable and 
unconstitutional. Although these cases importantly brought attention 
to the arbitrary inequitable systems that typically based funding on a 
student’s zip code and led to significant school finance reforms in 
states where successful cases were brought, the success was limited. 
First, for states where equity claims were denied outright as 
nonjusticiable or violating the separation of powers doctrine, there 
was no recourse other than local advocacy efforts. Second, even in 
those states where equity claims were successful, that success was 
limited to guaranteeing near-equal funding compared to other 
wealthier school districts in the state but did not ensure that the 
funding was adequate to meet the educational needs of their at-risk 
and minority students. And with testing and accountability reforms 
beginning to take shape in states across the country, the need to 
ensure not only equitable, but also adequate funding to deliver equal 
educational opportunities for all children became equally important. 
B. The “Shift” to “Adequacy” Litigation
The struggle for equal educational opportunities in school 
desegregation litigation was rooted not only in the need to integrate 
students of different races, but also in the widely held belief that 
white-only schools offered a higher-quality education. If the white-
only schools were in disrepair, poorly resourced, and taught with 
teachers lacking certification, for example, there may not have been 
such desperation in integrating the schools.121 However, that often 
was not the case. Thus, while achieving a certain quality of education 
through desegregation remained a central theme, federal courts’ 
reluctance to impose monetary orders in order to affect the quality of 
education122 forced advocates to look elsewhere.
119. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 687-88
(Mont. 1989).
120. Id. at 690.
121. Although, undoubtedly, the inherent evil of separating children on the 
basis of race alone would have been attacked.
122. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74-78 (1995) (describing the prior 
district court’s desegregation orders resulting in millions of dollars in costs to 
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On the heels of increasingly challenging attempts to reduce 
inequalities in school funding for public school children based on 
federal and state constitutional equal protection claims, plaintiffs 
began asserting adequacy claims under the education clauses of state 
constitutions as a means to improve educational opportunities and 
achievement for all children.123 This “third wave” of school finance 
litigation—or adequacy litigation—shifted the focus away from 
trying to equalize the amount spent on each student and instead 
questioned the sufficiency of school funding for students based on 
educational need.124 Adequacy litigation is seen as a means of 
ensuring that all public school children (regardless of race or zip 
code) receive a minimum, adequate level of education, with one 
court describing adequacy litigation as establishing “a constitutional 
floor of minimally adequate education to which public school 
students are entitled.”125
As mentioned earlier, in some states, such as New York and 
Colorado, advocates turned to adequacy litigation, in part, because 
previous attempts at remedying the state’s school finance system 
based on equality arguments had failed.126 But, generally, there was a 
implement quality-of-education programs and capital construction). The Court 
rejected and remanded the district court’s order of increasing salaries across the 
board in order to attract white students outside of the district. Id. at 100.
123. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 481 (Sup. 
Ct. 2001) (describing how the previous school finance litigation in New York “was 
among the majority of cases that found that unequal funding of school districts did 
not violate state equal protection clauses”); Jared S. Buszin, Beyond School 
Finance: Refocusing Education Reform Litigation to Realize the Deferred Dream of 
Education Equality and Adequacy, 62 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1621-22 (2013). 
124. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 481; Buszin, supra
note 123, at 1621. 
125. Campaign for Fiscal Equality, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 481; see Buszin, supra
note 123, at 1621 (describing adequacy litigation as litigation wherein “courts have 
interpreted the education clauses in state constitutions to require states to provide a 
substantive education that does not fall below a minimally adequate level”); Paul L. 
Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy: Looking Backward and Forward 
Through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 411, 420-21 (2008) 
(describing New Jersey’s definition of a “thorough and efficient” or “adequate 
education” as requiring “an equal educational opportunity for all that must be 
understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the 
contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in 
the labor market, but not the best possible education” (footnotes omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
126. See Campaign for Fiscal Equality, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 479; Buszin, supra
note 123, at 1620; see also James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance 
Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 450 (1999).
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growing belief that equalizing expenditures per student alone did not 
always result in equalizing educational opportunities for all public 
school children.127 Indeed, other factors, including socioeconomic 
status and race, tended to impact educational achievement, 
essentially requiring certain school districts “to spend more than 
average simply to provide average educational opportunities.”128
How courts would address the disparities among school districts and, 
particularly, the special needs of at-risk student populations in 
primarily low-wealth districts that enroll high concentrations of 
minority and low-income children, would come to mark the success 
of adequacy litigation at achieving sufficiency in school funding, and 
for all public school children.
1. Problems with Defining an Adequate Education
Adequacy claims originate from the education clauses of state 
constitutions, which require state legislatures to provide for a public-
education system using terms such as “thorough and efficient,”
“adequate,” or “ample.”129 While few can legitimately dispute that all 
children deserve a minimally adequate education,130 the real 
challenges in trying to achieve equal educational opportunities 
through adequacy litigation begin with defining what constitutes an 
adequate education.131
State courts weighing adequacy cases must interpret the 
meaning of an adequate education and set the standards used to apply 
and enforce that obligation on state defendants: pivotal 
responsibilities for the courts. If the bar is set too low, it renders the 
constitutional duty of providing an adequate education meaningless. 
127. See Rebell, supra note 13, at 227; Buszin, supra note 123, at 1630; see 
also Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *56 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (crediting expert opinion “that throwing money at an 
education problem without having goals in place for the spending and a system of 
accountability to measure the effectiveness of the spending is wasteful and not likely 
to result in improving student performance”), rev’d on other grounds, 599 S.E.2d 
365 (N.C. 2004). 
128. Ryan, supra note 126, at 435 (“The greater needs of poor children, 
coupled with the greater costs of operating urban schools, virtually guarantee that 
urban schools will have to spend more than average simply to provide average 
educational opportunities.”); see Rebell, supra note 13, at 227; Buszin, supra note 
123, at 1631. 
129. Rebell, supra note 13, at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted);
Buszin, supra note 123, at 1621-22. 
130. Buszin, supra note 123, at 1622.
131. See Rebell, supra note 13, at 231. 
604 Michigan State Law Review 2014:575
If the bar is set too high, it may become judicially unmanageable.132
The courts must also decide whether to use prudential standards, 
plain-meaning language, state educational standards, or a 
combination thereof when defining an adequate education. 
One of the inherent problems in using state standards to define 
an adequate education is that states may set the bar low for an 
accredited education and, in turn, fund high-poverty, high-minority 
schools only up to that level.133 In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court 
equated the provision of an adequate education with state 
accreditation standards and found that the cost of providing an 
accredited education was $3,500 per student.134 This was particularly 
problematic because the state created the accreditation standards to 
ensure that most school districts met those standards, not to ensure 
that students were receiving an adequate education.135 The court did 
hold that the Texas legislature’s discretion was not limitless, stating 
the legislature could be held liable if it “define[d] what constitutes a 
general diffusion of knowledge so low as to avoid its obligation to 
make suitable provision imposed by article VII, section 1” of the 
Texas constitution (the education clause).136 Nevertheless, when the 
Texas Supreme Court weighed the efficiency of the Texas public-
education system in 2005, the court found compelling the fact that 
most plaintiff school districts were accredited.137
In Kansas, the Kansas Supreme Court initially tied the state’s 
duty of providing an adequate education to the state educational 
standards and found that, through the accreditation standards, all 
132. See Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex. 2005) (comparing, at one 
extreme, a first-grade reading standard as inadequate and, at the other, an adequacy 
standard requiring that all students must be taught “multiple languages or nuclear 
biophysics” and provided unlimited resources). 
133. Ryan, supra note 88, at 260 (“Many school finance and school 
desegregation cases thus have become primarily concerned with obtaining sufficient
funds to finance a basic level of education in the poorest and/or most racially 
isolated school districts.”).
134. See Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 
717, 730 (Tex. 1995).
135. See Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d at 788 (“[T]he requirements for an 
‘academically acceptable’ rating are set to assure, not that there will be a general 
diffusion of knowledge, but that almost every district will meet them.”).
136. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 730 n.8.
137. See Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d at 791-92 (discussing implications of 
accredited schools in striking down efficiency/equity claims). Curiously though, the 
same court held the fact that school districts were providing an accredited education 
did not preclude the court from holding the system in violation of an Article VIII, § 
1(e) claim. Id. at 797.
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school districts were meeting that standard.138 The state legislature 
later eliminated those educational goals, and when students and 
districts again challenged the school finance system, a lower court 
dismissed the case, citing the decision in USD 229.139 The Kansas 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the court held previously 
that accreditation standards serve as a base for defining suitability, 
the legislature did not have unfettered discretion and the plaintiffs 
should be able to prove that achievement gaps based on race and 
socioeconomic status—among other evidence—demonstrate an 
inadequate and unsuitable education.140 The court further counseled 
that “‘[t]he issue of suitability is not stagnant; past history teaches 
that this issue must be closely monitored.’”141
In Colorado, the state supreme court used neither state 
standards nor prudential standards in determining what constitutes an 
adequate education. There, the court previously held, on an appeal 
reversing a dismissal in favor of defendants at the pleading stage, 
138. See USD 229, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994) (holding that the court 
would “utilize as a base the standards enunciated by the legislature and the state 
department of education”). The standards were the educational goals then existing in 
K.S.A. 72-6439(a):
(1) Teachers establish high expectations for learning and monitoring pupil 
achievement through multiple assessment techniques; (2) schools have a 
basic mission which prepares the learners to live, learn, and work in a 
global society; (3) schools provide planned learning activities within an 
orderly and safe environment which is conducive to learning; (4) schools 
provide instructional leadership which results in improved pupil 
performance in an effective school environment; (5) pupils have the 
communication skills necessary to live, learn, and work in a global 
society; (6) pupils think creatively and problem-solve in order to live, 
learn and work in a global society; (7) pupils work effectively both 
independently and in groups in order to live, learn and work in a global 
society; (8) pupils have the physical and emotional well-being necessary 
to live, learn and work in a global society; (9) all staff engage in ongoing 
professional development; [and] (10) pupils participate in lifelong 
learning. 
Id. at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. See Montoy v. State (Montoy I), 62 P.3d 228, 230, 233-35 (Kan. 2003).
140. Id. at 233-35.
141. Id. at 234 (quoting USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1186). The Texas courts have 
held similarly that “the State’s provision for a general diffusion of knowledge must 
reflect changing times, needs, and public expectations.” Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 
at 732 n.14. Texas has not consistently applied this provision and dismissed 
allegations showing gaping deficiencies in the state accreditation standards in 2004. 
See Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d at 787-88. Such holdings remain important when state 
courts do use state standards as a gauge for determining the merits of adequacy 
claims. 
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that the trial court must “determine whether the state’s public school 
financing system is rationally related to the constitutional mandate 
that the General Assembly provide a ‘thorough and uniform’ system 
of public education.”142 The trial court accepted the higher court’s 
suggestion that it may “rely on the legislature’s own pronouncements 
[to develop] the meaning of a ‘thorough and uniform’ system of 
education”143 and ultimately held the system “irrational, arbitrary, 
and severely underfunded.”144 Ignoring both the history surrounding 
the education clause and the standards and goals imposed by the 
Colorado General Assembly, the state supreme court selectively 
interpreted the words “‘thorough’” and “‘uniform,’” ultimately 
concluding the current system met the mandate because it was “of a 
quality marked by completeness, is comprehensive, and is consistent 
across the state.”145
Courts that have had greater success in ruling on adequacy 
cases and weighing educational opportunities tend to invoke 
prudential-type standards for an adequate education. Using such 
prudential standards not only avoids arbitrarily setting accreditation 
standards too low, but also gives clearer, meaningful guidance to 
state legislatures, litigants, and the courts on the important issue of 
adequate funding that can withstand the test of time. One of the 
early, landmark adequacy decisions was Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, Inc., in which plaintiffs representing poor school districts 
alleged that the Kentucky school finance system was so inadequate 
and inequitable “as to result in an inefficient system of common 
school education in violation of [the] Kentucky Constitution . . . and 
the equal protection clause and the due process of law clause of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment.”146 In Rose, the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky credited the trial court’s findings that Kentucky’s school 
financing system was unconstitutional because “students in property 
poor school districts are offered a minimal level of educational 
opportunities, which is inferior to those offered to students in more 
affluent districts.”147 The trial court referred to this disparate 
treatment as “‘invidious’ discrimination, based on the place of a 
142. Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). 
143. Id.
144. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 18, at 182.
145. Compare Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1140-41 (Colo. 2013) (en 
banc), with id. at 1151-60 (Hobbs, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
selective definitions of “thorough and uniform”).
146. 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989).
147. Id. at 192.
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student’s residence.”148 However, what distinguishes Rose from 
earlier school finance litigation based on equal protection claims is 
that the Supreme Court of Kentucky further recognized that 
problems within Kentucky’s school system could not simply be 
addressed through financial equalization between districts.149 For 
example, the court noted that “[a] substantial difference in the 
curricula offered in the poorer districts contrasts with that of the 
richer districts, particularly in the areas of foreign language, science, 
mathematics, music and art.”150 This recognition that the 
achievement of an adequate education included more than just
accounting for particular financial inputs into a given school district 
led the court to establish a standards-based definition of what it 
would mean for a child in Kentucky to achieve an “efficient” 
education for state constitutional purposes, which included:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to 
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient 
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student 
to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or 
her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and 
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for 
advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable 
each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient 
levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to 
compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in 
academics or in the job market.151
Other state courts later adopted Kentucky’s definition of an 
“efficient” education or referenced it as a basis when defining what 
constitutes an adequate education.152
2. Choosing the “Right” Plaintiffs
Critics of school finance cases often lament advocates for 
failing to be more selective in choosing the plaintiffs and claims that 
more closely align with the denial of equal educational 
148. Id.
149. Id. at 197.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 212. 
152. See Rebell, supra note 13, at 235-36. 
608 Michigan State Law Review 2014:575
opportunities.153 This can be a great concern where claims that the 
education of all students in a given state or school district is 
insufficiently funded for purposes of achieving an adequate 
education may, in turn, cloud the reality that low-wealth districts 
with high concentrations of minority and low-income children are 
facing serious challenges to provide the caliber of education that 
wealthier plaintiff districts are already offering.154 Of course, with 
substantial education budget cuts made by state legislatures in recent 
years forcing all districts in a given state to cut teachers and 
educational programs while imposing additional mandates and 
raising educational demands on students, the delivery of an adequate 
education to all students may be at risk.155 However, when courts are 
receiving evidence of mixed success in public schools based on the 
performance of non-at-risk students, the compelling case for 
economically disadvantaged, ELL, and minority students can be lost. 
In Colorado, for example, several parents of school children 
and school districts of all types sued the state for failing to provide a 
“thorough and uniform” public education system as required under 
the Colorado constitution. These included parents and school 
districts from the impoverished, high-minority districts in the San 
Luis Valley, to the wealthy suburban, majority white districts of 
Boulder Valley and Cherry Creek. The district court made key 
findings related to at-risk students, finding that in every area tested, 
in every grade level, “students who qualify for free or reduced lunch 
score much lower than students who are not free or reduced lunch 
eligible.”156 The court determined that the system established in 
Colorado for providing at-risk funding for low-income children was 
both “arbitrary and irrational.”157 Similarly, for ELL students, “[a]t 
153. See Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A 
Critical Appraisal, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF 
EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 1, 3 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) 
(discussing that even after judicial relief is ordered there is no guarantee that the 
funds will reach the students).
154. See Buszin, supra note 123, at 1627 (“The academic performance of an 
average black or Hispanic student is equivalent to the performance of an average 
white student in the lowest quartile of white achievement.”). 
155. See, e.g, Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1150 (Colo. 2013) (en banc) 
(recognizing the $1 billion cut to education); Patrick Michels, $5.4 Billion Spending 
Cut Already Taking a Toll on Schools, TEX. OBSERVER (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.texasobserver.org/54-billion-spending-cut-already-taking-a-toll-on-
schools/ (describing $5.4 billion cut to the Texas education budget).
156. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 18, at 102.
157. Id. at 99-100 (crediting expert testimony that Colorado’s school finance 
formula for at-risk students “has a low set of weights, a low count method because it 
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all grade levels and in all content areas tested, fewer than ten percent 
of [beginner ELL] students scored proficient on [Colorado’s student 
assessment test] in reading, writing, and math in 2009.”158 The court 
went on to explicitly find that “Colorado is not providing adequate 
funding for basic instructional programs for English language 
learners and no funding for supplementary programs, thereby making 
it unlikely the achievement gap will close in the foreseeable 
future.”159
By contrast, the performance of non-economically 
disadvantaged students, non-ELL students, and non-minority 
students showed a different Colorado. Boulder Valley, for example, 
is a property-wealthy district and on the whole was a high-
performing district, yet the district had “one of the largest 
achievement gaps in Colorado” when it came to low-income 
students, ELL students, minority students, and students requiring 
special education programs.160 The defendants boasted of Colorado’s 
overall achievement nationally, ranking near the top of the states on 
nearly every National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
administered in grades four and eight.161 Despite an overwhelming 
record contrasting the struggles between property-poor and property-
wealthy districts and the struggles between at-risk and non-at-risk 
students in meeting state and national standards, the trial court 
perhaps overreached in concluding that the entire system was 
unconstitutional because “[a]ll School Districts lack the funding 
necessary to meet the increased expectations of the current revisions 
to standards-based education.”162 On appeal, the state supreme court
overturned the lower’s court ruling that the Colorado school finance 
system was unconstitutional.163 The Colorado Supreme Court did 
acknowledge that the lower court had demonstrated that Colorado’s 
school-financing system “might not be ideal,” but rested on its 
conclusion that “the system passes constitutional muster.”164 While it 
only counts [students eligible for] free lunch as opposed to free and reduced lunch, 
and a low base” resulting in “a system that really doesn’t drive substantively any 
additional resources into the higher-need districts” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
158. Id. at 96.
159. Id. at 97.
160. Id. at 144-45.
161. Defendants-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 39-40, Lobato v. State, No. 
2012SA25 (Colo. July 18, 2012).
162. Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, supra note 18, at 178.
163. Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Colo. 2013) (en banc). 
164. Id. at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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is not apparent from the opinion that the majority in Lobato rested its 
decision, in part, on the “mixed success” in the record, it is hardly 
conceivable that a court could ignore the incredible record of vastly 
deficient educational opportunities and achievement for minority and 
at-risk students and hold the system constitutional. As Chief Justice 
Michael Bender stated in his stinging dissent: 
The record, however, reveals an education system that is fundamentally 
broken. It is plagued by underfunding and marked by gross funding 
disparities among districts. Colorado’s school-age population has 
exploded, with dramatic increases in the number of Hispanic students, 
low-income students, English language learners, and students with special 
needs. The General Assembly has failed to recognize these changes and to 
fund the increased costs necessary to educate these children. Colorado’s 
education system is, beyond any reasonable doubt, neither thorough nor 
uniform.165
The Texas Supreme Court similarly dismissed an 
overwhelming record of contrasting achievement between at-risk and 
minority students and non-at-risk and majority students in a case 
brought by a range of school districts asserting general adequacy 
claims. There, over 300 school districts challenged the adequacy of 
the Texas school finance system, ranging from the property-poor 
Edgewood ISD plaintiff–intervenor districts to the property-wealthy 
districts located in Alamo Heights, Plano, and Highland Park.166 The 
court acknowledged the wide achievement gaps between white 
students and their Latino, black, and economically disadvantaged 
peers, as well as large gaps in dropout and graduation rates.167 The 
court also noted that the number of state standardized tests increased, 
as well as the punitive measures applied to students through the 
expansion of high-stakes testing.168 As a result, districts incurred 
significant costs for remediation, including “summer school, 
remedial classes, curriculum specialists, [and] reduced class-size.”169
The court then put aside this striking evidence, self-selecting instead 
evidence of two outputs to hold that the system was adequate, 
finding that Texas scores on the NAEP had “improved relative to the 
other states,” and Texas Assessment of Knowledge Skills scores 
showed some improvement in the first two years of testing.170
165. Id. (Bender, J., dissenting).
166. Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d 746, 751 & n.2 (Tex. 2005).
167. Id. at 766-69, 789.
168. Id. at 765.
169. Id. at 769.
170. Id. at 789. The court apparently disregarded the fact that Texas ranked 
thirty-seventh among states. Id. at 768-69.
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Ultimately, on the adequacy claim, the court held, “[W]e cannot 
conclude that the Legislature has acted arbitrarily in structuring and 
funding the public education system so that school districts are not 
reasonably able to afford all students the access to education and the 
educational opportunity to accomplish a general diffusion of 
knowledge.”171
Texas may be the proving ground to determine whether 
bringing stronger, more specific adequacy claims on behalf of 
economically disadvantaged and ELL plaintiff students can be 
successful. In 2011, MALDEF filed suit against Texas alleging such 
narrower claims and, following a three-month trial, the district court 
held in favor of the at-risk students’ adequacy claim.172 That case, 
following a three-week hearing after the district court re-opened the 
evidence to consider legislative changes, again resulted in a ruling in 
favor of the at-risk students.173 The state defendants are expected to 
appeal the ruling, which will ultimately be decided by the Texas 
Supreme Court.
Some adequacy cases have proven more auspicious to fulfilling 
the promise of Brown by bringing specific claims on behalf of at-risk 
and minority students. In Williams v. California, economically 
disadvantaged and minority students enrolled in mostly segregated 
schools filed suit under the California Constitution, arguing that they 
were being provided unequal tools to acquire a fundamental 
education.174 These disparities in resources included a lack of 
qualified teachers, a lack of adequate facilities in both condition and 
space, and a lack of instructional materials.175 After four years of 
litigation, the case eventually settled with five bills signed into law 
171. Id. at 789-90.
172. Court’s Ruling at 1, Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal. v. 
Williams, No. D-1-GN-11-003130 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 4, 2013).
173. See Press Release, MALDEF, Travis County District Court Declares 
Current Texas School Finance System Unconstitutional—Again (Aug. 28, 2014), 
available at 
https://maldef.org/news/releases/tcd_court_declares_finance_system_unconstitution
al_again/ (including a link to final judgment and findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coalition v. Williams). In the 2013 
legislative session following the court’s ruling, the Texas legislature enacted some 
educational reforms (for example, reducing high-stakes end-of-course exams for 
high school students) and replaced approximately $3.4 billion of the $5.4 billion 
previously cut from public education, and the court reopened the evidence. See id. 
The court rejected the state’s claims that the legislation mooted and un-ripened the 
claims and held the public school finance system unconstitutional. Id.
174. Oakes & Lipton, supra note 10, at 25.
175. Id. at 25-26.
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that guaranteed California’s students “‘appropriate teacher 
assignment, sufficient instructional materials, and facilities in good 
repair.’”176 The settlement also created standards and accountability 
measures, including school district oversight and assistance to the 
lowest performing schools, which led to increased student 
performance in those schools.177
In North Carolina, plaintiffs representing property-poor school 
districts and plaintiff–intervenors representing wealthy school 
districts both alleged that the North Carolina school finance system 
was inadequate and that North Carolina students were being denied 
“their fundamental constitutional right to equal educational 
opportunities.”178 The trial court determined that the North Carolina 
school finance system “is valid, sound and flexible enough to 
provide for the delivery of adequate funding to all school systems in 
North Carolina . . . so that they may provide each child with the 
equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education” but, at the same 
time, recognized that “[e]conomically disadvantaged children, more 
so than economically advantaged children, need opportunities and 
services over and above those provided to the general student 
population in order to put them in a position to obtain an equal
opportunity to receive a sound basic education.”179 The trial court 
specifically identified poverty, racial and ethnic minority status, and 
“lack of English language proficiency” among the socioeconomic 
factors that “place students at risk of educational failure.”180 For 
example, in “1998-1999, the [end of grade] test results for 
mathematics and reading combined for the third grade by race 
showed . . . 46.4% (680) of American Indian children scored below 
Level III; 56.1% (17,728) of Black children scored below Level III; 
176. SALLY CHUNG, ACLU FOUND. OF S. CAL., WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA:
LESSONS FROM NINE YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION 6-7 (2013) (quoting Letter from 
Tom Torlakson, Superintendent, and Mike Kirst, President, State Bd. of Educ., to 




177. Id. at 7 (finding that thousands of textbooks were being provided in the 
classroom and a decrease in the number of classes taught by “misassigned 
teachers”).
178. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, 
at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), rev’d on other grounds 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 
2004).
179. Id. at *91, *97.
180. Id. at *94.
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[and] 49.8% (1462) of Hispanic children scored below Level III,” 
while only “25.6% (16,068) of White children scored below Level 
III.”181 For the same school year, in grades three through eight, 
“79.2% of white students . . . were performing at grade level (Level 
III or above) in reading and math as compared to 48.5% of Black 
students, 55.5% of Native American students and 55.6% of Hispanic 
Students.”182
The court next identified quality pre-kindergarten programs as 
“an effective means of increasing the performance of low-income 
and otherwise at-risk students.”183 Based on the facts presented, the 
court ultimately concluded that at-risk children in North Carolina 
were “being denied their fundamental constitutional right to receive 
the equal opportunity to a sound basic education” because of “the 
failure of the State to provide early childhood education in the form 
of quality pre-kindergarten educational programs.”184 The court 
ordered that the state provide pre-kindergarten educational programs 
for all at-risk children that qualify for the program.185 These cases, 
among others in New Jersey, Kansas, Wyoming, and South Carolina, 
demonstrate that more specific claims brought by a more defined 
plaintiff class may result in more favorable outcomes targeting at-
risk students compared to more generalized adequacy claims.
3. The Problems with Remedies
A major problem with remedying the lingering inequalities and 
inadequacies in state school finance systems is the courts’ concern 
with overstepping their judicial power and encroaching upon the 
legislatures’ power to enact laws. Courts typically have broad 
remedial powers to address legal wrongs.186 Where a constitutional 
181. Id. at *99; see also id. at *10 (determining that academic performance 
less than Level II “is a constitutionally unacceptable minimum standard”). 
182. Id. at *99.
183. Id. at *106.
184. Id. at *113; see also id. at *107 (“The absence of such pre-school 
intervention for at-risk children materially affects their being able to have the equal 
opportunity to obtain a sound basic education from the start of their academic 
ladder.”). But see Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393-95 (N.C. 
2004) (upholding inadequacy finding but reversing remedial order requiring pre-
kindergarten for all at-risk students).
185. Id. at *113.
186. See, e.g., Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: 
School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1624 
(2003) (noting the historical power of the courts in public interest law litigation); id. 
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violation is proven, courts have the power to declare the acts in 
question unconstitutional, to order injunctive relief, and to ensure 
that any harms proven are redressed.187 However, in education-
related cases, state courts often defer substantially (if not wholly) to 
state legislatures in remedying the constitutional violation.188 Like 
many federal courts in Brown and other school desegregation cases, 
many state courts in school finance cases are seemingly reluctant to 
issue injunctions specifying remedies.189 Although state courts should 
defer to the legislative branch in enacting a remedy because they are 
the branch of government principally assigned to establishing public 
school finance systems, courts can appropriately influence those 
remedies by: first, issuing more specific declaratory and injunctive 
relief aimed at the harms shown in court; and second, by reviewing 
the legislative remedies to ensure that they correct the violations 
found, as opposed to back-door deals that typically influence 
remedies. These actions are not uncommon practices of the courts 
and should help ensure that those students harmed by the inequitable 
and inadequate school finance systems are provided with relief that 
will ultimately lead to the provision of equal educational 
opportunities. 
Critics of school finance cases often argue that courts are ill 
prepared to oversee school finance reform because of the inherent 
politics and varying interests involved.190 They point to protracted 
litigation as a sign of the ineffectiveness of school finance cases as a 
at 1644 (finding that, in spite of popular belief to the contrary, federal district courts 
still “have the power and ability to effectuate more meaningful desegregation of 
public schools than they have undertaken”). 
187. See, e.g., Montoy III, 112 P.3d 923, 931 (Kan. 2005) (“‘Nor should 
doubts about the court’s equitable power to spur legislative action or to reject 
deficient legislation impede judicious over-sight. An active judicial role in 
monitoring remedy formulation is well-rooted in the courts’ equitable powers. As 
long as such power is exercised only after legislative noncompliance, it is entirely 
appropriate.’” (quoting Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and 
State Courts, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1072, 1088 (1991))).
188. See Buszin, supra note 123, at 1624-25; see also United States v. Texas, 
680 F.2d 356, 372-74 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding injunctive relief moot in EEOA 
language rights case where district court’s injunctive relief should have given 
deference to consideration of new laws passed by Texas legislature in addressing 
statutory violations). 
189. See Parker, supra note 186, at 1642-44 (discussing the trepidation of 
courts in directing educational officials in school desegregation cases).
190. See Heise, supra note 7, at 2438-40 (discussing political reservations by 
the public and others related to school finance remedies).
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remedy to ensuring equal educational opportunities.191 However, 
none of these arguments are meritorious. First, virtually every 
legislative act is subject to political wagering and diverse interests. 
Whether the issue involves redistricting, regulation of public utilities, 
driver’s licenses, employment, taxes, and the like, these matters are 
going to be subject to public debate. However, if a state legislature 
adopts a redistricting plan that purposefully draws boundaries to 
dilute minority voting strength, should those actions not be subject to 
judicial review under federal or state constitutions and laws enacted 
to ensure such does not occur? If a state legislature arbitrarily and 
unnecessarily regulates private companies offering public utilities, 
should those actions not be subject to review? Certainly, the answer 
is “no,” and the same logic applies to school finance litigation. 
Similarly, the fact that a small minority of states have engaged 
in protracted school finance litigation does not mean that courts are 
ill prepared to handle and resolve school-funding cases. If that were 
the case, we possibly could have seen a reversion to “separate but 
equal” de jure segregation in public schools. Instead, we have 
witnessed some courts creating and relying on strong, judicially 
manageable standards and then enforcing those standards when 
necessary either in the remedial phase or in separate litigation filed 
years later.
The Kansas school finance cases illustrate a good example of 
courts effectively exercising their judicial powers to interpret state 
actions against the constitution, identifying judicially manageable 
standards, and enforcing their orders when necessary to ensure equal 
educational opportunities for at-risk and minority students. The Mock 
case was the first among the contemporary school-funding cases192
alleging that the State had failed to “make suitable provision” for 
education, as required by the Kansas constitution, for students in 
lower-wealth school districts.193 In a 1991 pre-trial opinion, the 
district court held that each child must be given an educational 
191. Id. 
192. Kansas has been the subject of approximately eight separate school 
finance lawsuits, and about ten state supreme court opinions, over the past forty-five 
years. See USD 229, 885 P.2d 1170, 1175-78 (Kan. 1994) (describing history of 
school finance litigation up to 1994); see also John Robb & Alan Rupe School 
Finance Case File (on file with the author) (describing additional cases of 
Montoy/Robinson, Gannon, and Petrella).
193. USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1187. The Kansas Constitution’s education clause 
provides, “The legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the 
educational interests of the state.” KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(b).
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opportunity that is equal to that made available to every other child 
under the state constitution.194 The legislature responded by adopting 
a new school finance system in 1992 that provided low-wealth 
school districts with additional revenue while cutting taxes,195 but 
various groups of plaintiffs again sued, some alleging that the 
reforms did not go far enough, others that they went too far. In 1994, 
the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the school 
finance system and established standards to weigh future challenges. 
In defining a “suitable” education, the Kansas Supreme Court relied 
on the legislature’s goals and a constitutional provision requiring the 
legislature to “provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and 
scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public 
schools.”196 The court also held that “the issue of suitability is not 
stagnant” and “must be closely monitored.”197
These standards appropriately guided the Kansas courts in 
subsequent cases. Each time the legislature defaulted on its 
constitutional obligation to provide a suitable education, the courts 
held the state responsible.198 And each time the courts held the 
evidence demonstrated that the state had satisfied the standard, the 
courts denied plaintiffs relief.199
The Kansas courts also steadfastly ensured that the remedies 
targeted the violations. Following the Mock case, the legislature’s 
new school finance system dropped property taxes 38% and reduced 
194. Mock v. State, No. 91-CV-1009, slip op. at 7 (Shawnee Cnty. Dist. Ct. 
Oct. 14, 1991).
195. See USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1178.
196. Id. at 1186; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1.
197. USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1186; see also Montoy I, 62 P.3d 228, 235 (Kan. 
2003) (holding that the suitability provision may also be violated when the state 
funds education “so low that regardless of what the State says about accreditation, it 
would be impossible to find that the legislature has made ‘suitable provision for 
finance of the educational interests of the state’” (quoting KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 
6(b))).
198. See, e.g., Montoy v. State (Montoy II), 120 P.3d 306, 308 (Kan. 2005) 
(holding the system unconstitutional following legislative modifications to the 
school finance system); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1204, 1239 (Kan. 2014) 
(finding system inequitable for its failure to provide school districts with 
“reasonably equal access to substantially similar educational opportunity through 
similar tax effort” and remanding the adequacy claim to trial court for further 
findings).
199. See, e.g., USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1187, 1197 (finding the system suitable 
and constitutional); Montoy v. State (Montoy IV), 138 P.3d 755, 765 (Kan. 2006) 
(finding the State substantially complied with the supreme court’s mandates).
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the equity gaps between property-poor and property-rich districts.200
By 2003, the state legislature had scaled back its school-funding 
formulas and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a lower court 
ruling, finding the system inadequate and unsuitable for “middle-
and large-sized [school] districts with a high proportion of minority 
and/or at-risk and special education students.”201 The court also 
found that the state’s decision to base its formulas on “former 
spending levels and political compromise,” instead of actual costs, 
particularly impacted weighting factors for bilingual-education, 
special education, and at-risk students, among others.202 When the 
state again failed to increase sufficiently the funding and failed to 
base funding on actual costs, the court ordered the legislature to 
commit $285 million for the 2005–2006 school year and retained 
jurisdiction pending a legislative cost study.203 In 2006, Kansas 
passed legislation that was intended to increase funding for at-risk 
and ELL students, among others, and decrease inequities between 
school districts over a three-year period.204 The Kansas Supreme 
Court concluded that these targeted increases, though not perfect, 
substantially complied with its mandates and relinquished 
jurisdiction.205
The Wyoming courts have also adopted clear judicially 
manageable standards for the state legislature to follow in order for 
the state to meet its constitutional obligation of providing an 
equitable and adequate education and retained jurisdiction when 
necessary to monitor the remedy. In the Wyoming Supreme Court’s 
1995 decision in Campbell County School District v. Wyoming, the 
court issued guidelines for the legislature to follow in order to 
remedy the constitutional violations and ensure students were 
prepared to fulfill their roles as citizens and participants in the civic, 
200. See Robb & Rupe, supra note 192.
201. See Montoy II, 120 P.3d at 310.
202. See id. Even when the Kansas Legislature attempted to extract the cases 
from the courts, the courts responded strongly in judging the legislature’s failure to 
fulfill its constitutional duty. “‘The mountain labored and brought forth nothing at 
all,’ the judge wrote on May 11, referring to the Legislature’s inaction. ‘In fact, 
rather than attack the problem, the Legislature chose instead to attack the court.’”
Winter, supra note 89.
203. Montoy III, 112 P.3d 923, 940-41 (Kan. 2005) (basing this figure on the 
2001 cost study ordered by the legislature and taking into account current budget 
levels).
204. See Montoy IV, 138 P.3d at 760-65.
205. Id. at 765.
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economic, and intellectual world upon graduation.206 Based on the 
trial record, the court specified that educational opportunities should 
include small class sizes, at-risk programs, and meaningful standards 
and assessments.207 The Wyoming courts required the state to base its 
funding on actual costs and the state, consequently, engaged in a cost 
study.208 In 2008, the Wyoming Supreme Court again scrutinized the 
funding elements, including at-risk formula funding, and concluded 
the system passed constitutional muster.209 The Wyoming courts’ 
dutiful job of weighing the actions of the legislature against the 
constitutional standards, and its persistence in ensuring the 
legislature’s remedy corrected the deficiencies, including 
opportunities for at-risk students, personifies the potential of school 
finance litigation in achieving equal educational opportunities.210
New Jersey is often criticized for its litigious history, but in 
fact, it represents a dogged approach by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in holding the legislature to its duty of curing constitutional 
deficiencies identified by the courts based on the evidence.211 In 
1970, poor urban districts raised federal and state equal protection 
claims, alleging that they were denied “constitutional education[al] 
206. See School Funding Cases in Wyoming, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS 
NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info/2012/05/school-funding-cases-in-wyoming/ 
(last updated Apr. 2012) (citing Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 
(Wyo. 1995)). 
207. See Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 907 P.2d at 1279. 
208. School Funding Cases in Wyoming, supra note 206.
209. Id. 
210. The Washington Supreme Court has also held that its education article, 
Washington Constitution, article IX, section 1, “imposes a judicially enforceable 
affirmative duty on the State to make ample provision for the education of all 
children residing within its borders” and relies, in part, on statutes. McCleary v. 
State, 269 P.3d 227, 231-32 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). The Washington Court defines 
education as the means to acquire the basic knowledge and skills needed to compete 
in today’s economy and meaningfully participate in this state’s democracy. Id. at 
231. In describing the substantive content of the knowledge and skills, the court uses 
the state’s “broad educational concepts outlined in Seattle School District, the four 
learning goals in Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1209, 53d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 1993), and the State’s essential academic learning requirements 
(EALRs).” Id. In January 2012, the Washington Supreme Court found the state had 
not fulfilled its constitutional duty in amply providing an education. Id.
211. As the Texas Supreme Court aptly stated, 
[T]he continued litigation over public school finance cannot fairly be 
blamed on constitutional standards that are not judicially manageable; the 
principal cause of continued litigation, as we see it, is the difficulty the 
Legislature has in designing and funding public education in the face of 
strong and divergent political pressures.
Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d 746, 779 (Tex. 2005).
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guarantees.”212 The New Jersey Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ 
equal protection claims but upheld a claim that the New Jersey 
school finance system “violated the New Jersey Constitution’s 
‘thorough and efficient’ clause.”213 The Robinson cases culminated 
with the passage of the Public Education Act of 1975, which was 
intended to address the funding concerns identified by the court.214 In 
1981, poor school districts challenged the Public Education Act of
1975 as insufficiently addressing the disparities between poor and 
affluent school districts.215 This challenge ultimately spurred decades 
of adequacy and equity litigation, known as the Abbott cases, in 
which the Public Education Act of 1975 and two other pieces of 
school finance legislation, the Quality Education Act of 1990 and the 
Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act of 1996, 
were found unconstitutional.216
After determining that the Public Education Act of 1975 was 
unconstitutional, particularly as applied to poorer urban districts,217
instead of merely delegating the legislature the responsibility of 
remedying the situation and then approving the remedy, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court repeatedly assessed the legislature’s remedies 
and called for further action when necessary. For example, in 
response to the court’s previous orders, the New Jersey legislature 
passed the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing 
Act (CEIFA) in 1996.218 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court 
confirmed that the content standards established under the act were 
“an essential component of a thorough and efficient education,” the 
Court concluded that “[t]he standards themselves do not ensure any 
substantive level of achievement,”219 and that the “standards, 
therefore, cannot answer the fundamental inquiry of whether the new 
statute assures the level of resources needed to provide a thorough 
and efficient education to children in the special needs districts.”220
Specifically, the court admonished the legislature for assessing the 
level of resources needed to provide a thorough and efficient 
212. Deborah L. Sanders, On School Funding, Remands, and Chosen Wise 
Men: Judge King and the Remand Option Aimed at Fulfilling the Constitutional 
Mandate for a Thorough and Efficient Education, 35 RUTGERS L.J. xlix, l (2004). 
213. Id. at li.
214. Id.
215. Id. at xlii. 
216. Tractenberg, supra note 125, at 419. 
217. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
218. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 425 (N.J. 1997).
219. Id. at 420, 428.
220. Id. at 429. 
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education on the basis of a “model district” that did not resemble the 
characteristics of New Jersey’s wealthy districts or its special-needs 
districts.221 The court went on to hold CEIFA to be “unconstitutional 
as applied to the special needs districts” and ordered remedial relief 
specifically “directed to those constitutional deficiencies.”222 The 
court “require[d] that funding for regular education in the special 
needs districts be increased” and “order[ed] the State to study, 
identify, fund, and implement the supplemental programs required to 
redress the disadvantages of public school children in the special 
needs districts.”223 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court presents an 
example of a court not only refusing to equate established standards 
and legislative assurances with an adequate education, but also 
demanding that the legislature ensure that adequacy in educational 
opportunities is achieved across the state’s districts. 
The results of the court’s targeted efforts speak for themselves. 
In preschool and early elementary grades, where the Abbott reforms 
were primarily targeted, the Abbott school districts have shown 
impressive improvement.224 For example, preschool enrollment 
increased “from 19,000 children served in the 1999-2000 school year 
to a peak enrollment of over 39,000 in 2004-05 when 76 percent of 
the estimated eligible population of three- and four-year-olds were 
being served.”225 Furthermore, 
[t]he percentage of general education students in Abbott elementary 
schools scoring at least proficient on the language arts literacy test rose 
from 63 percent in 2000-01 to 77 percent in 2004-05. During the same 
time period, proficiency levels barely changed in the other poor districts as
and in all non-Abbott districts as a whole.226
In Abbott XX, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a new 
school finance law, the School Funding and Reform Act of 2008 
(SFRA), was constitutional, and that the state was no longer held to 
221. Id. at 429-31. 
222. Id. at 421. 
223. Id.
224. EDUC. LAW CTR., THE ABBOTT DISTRICTS IN 2005-06: PROGRESS AND 
CHALLENGES 3 (2006), available at http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/ 
publications/AbbottIndicatorsReport_2005_06.pdf. According to the Education Law 
Center, which litigates for the Abbott district plaintiffs, other accomplishments 
include the “narrowing of the achievement gap between suburban and urban” school 
districts and substantial improvement in funding for at-risk and high-need school 
districts. See Results, EDUC. LAW CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/results.html 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
225. EDUC. LAW CTR., supra note 224, at 3.
226. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). 
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the court’s previous remedial orders.227 However, merely two years 
later, the plaintiffs were back in court seeking to enforce their rights 
pursuant to the Abbott XX decision because the state had failed to 
fully fund the SFRA, as required by the court when it granted the 
state reprieve from its previous remedial efforts.228 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court refused to credit the state’s argument that the court 
must defer to the legislature, finding that “[l]ike anyone else, the 
State is not free to walk away from judicial orders enforcing 
constitutional obligations.”229 Instead of allowing adequacy in 
education to remain a low bar, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recognized the disparity in the provision of an adequate education to 
all school children, particularly those in the special needs districts, as 
a constitutional deprivation and continues to challenge the legislature 
to ensure a means for achieving an adequate education in those 
districts.230
North Carolina’s courts have perhaps struggled a bit with 
providing the legislature too much leniency. First, the Hoke Court 
appropriately refused to limit its inquiry of adequacy to a 
constitutional facial challenge of legislatively established 
standards.231 Instead, the court determined, based on the record, that 
at-risk students required more resources than average students to 
achieve adequacy and equality in educational opportunities.232 The 
court ordered the legislature to develop a specific remedy in order to 
remediate the constitutional deprivation.233 Unfortunately, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court ultimately reversed the trial court’s order 
that the state provide pre-kindergarten educational programs to all at-
risk children that qualify.234 The North Carolina Supreme Court 
227. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 971 A.2d 989, 992-93 (N.J. 2009) (“In 
sum, although no prediction is without some uncertainty, the record before us 
convincingly demonstrates that SFRA is designed to provide school districts in this 
state, including the Abbott school districts, with adequate resources to provide the 
necessary educational programs consistent with state standards.”). 
228. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 20 A.3d 1018, 1023-24 (N.J. 2011). 
229. Id. at 1024.
230. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 434 (N.J. 1997) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has 
recognized consistently that the exceptional needs of the SNDs [special needs 
districts] must be addressed if the constitutional deprivation is to be remediated.”). 
231. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, 
at *91 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 599 S.E.2d 365 
(N.C. 2004).
232. Id. at *91, *97.
233. Id. at *113.
234. See Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393-95 (N.C. 
2004). 
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called the trial court’s remedy “premature” and cautioned that “its 
strict enforcement could undermine the state’s ability to meet its 
educational obligations for ‘at-risk’ prospective enrollees by 
alternative means.”235 Essentially, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
gave in to what the court referred to as “recogniz[ing] our limitations 
in providing specific remedies for violations committed by other 
government branches in service to a subject matter, such as public 
school education, that is within their primary domain.”236
However, once the state legislature established a pre-
kindergarten program to address the needs of at-risk students, and a 
state budget bill subsequently threatened to limit admittance of 
eligible at-risk students to the program, the North Carolina Superior 
Court stepped in to block the challenged section of the bill.237
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court granted deference to the 
state legislature to craft a remedy for identified constitutional 
deprivations, the Superior Court would not allow North Carolina to 
“walk away” from its obligations under the North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s previous order.238 Moreover, the North Carolina Superior 
Court will likely have the opportunity to address the needs of at-risk 
students once again. Recently, plaintiffs filed a motion alleging that 
the state has “abandoned many of the remedial commitments [it has] 
made to the court over the past 10 years.”239 Evidence that “the 
percentage of at-risk students . . . has increased from 38.9% in 1997-
98 to 48.5% in 2006-07” may convince the North Carolina Superior 
Court that more targeted orders are necessary in order for the state to 
take its constitutional deprivations seriously.240
Other courts have struggled to ensure equal educational 
opportunities in school finance lawsuits by failing to maintain strong 
judicial standards or to enforce or apply effectively their standards. 
235. Id. at 395 (finding that neither the plaintiffs nor the State had 
“demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Court that [pre-kindergarten] is either the 
only qualifying means or even the only known qualifying means” for addressing the 
needs of at-risk students). 
236. Id.
237. See Memorandum of Decision & Order Re: Pre-Kindergarten Services 
for At-Risk Four Year Olds at 24, Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 95CVS1158, 
available at http://www.wral.com/asset/news/education/2011/07/18/9875183/
ruling.pdf.
238. Id. at 23-24. 
239. N. Carolina Plaintiffs File Major Non-Compliance Motion, NAT’L 
EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK (May 28, 2014), http://schoolfunding.info/2014/05/n-
carolina-plaintiffs-file-major-non-compliance-motion/.
240. Id.
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In Texas, the state supreme court established a strong standard for 
equity claims in Edgewood v. Kirby, holding that the efficiency 
mandate under the education clause of the Texas constitution241
required that “[t]here must be a direct and close correlation between 
a district’s tax effort and the educational resources available to it; in 
other words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar 
revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.”242 The court 
dutifully applied this standard when the legislature’s next school 
finance plan arbitrarily exempted 132 super-wealthy school districts 
from the equalized school finance system, holding the system again 
unconstitutional.243 But over the years, the Texas Supreme Court 
seemingly watered down this standard by first requiring equity only 
up to the cost of providing an adequate education,244 then accepting a 
nine-cent tax advantage in favor of property-wealthy school districts 
as satisfying the equity standard,245 and exempting a small number of 
super-property wealthy school districts who were held harmless from 
the imposition of the Edgewood I mandate based on the state’s word 
that it would eventually phase out those school districts’ substantial 
equity advantage.246 For the substantial number of at-risk and 
minority school children enrolled in the state’s poorest school 
districts, the promise of competing on a level playing field remains 
just that—a promise, unfulfilled.
Texas’s handling of adequacy claims also provides little 
recourse due to the courts’ application of the standard. Like the 
Kansas court, the Texas Supreme Court created a strong, judicially 
enforceable standard for adequacy claims tied to state statutory goals 
for public education and held that the legislature cannot set the bar 
for adequacy so low that students do not acquire a general diffusion 
of knowledge.247 But, as with the equity claim, the court struggled to 
241. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge being 
essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the 
duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the 
support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.”). 
242. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
243. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 
496, 498 (Tex. 1991).
244. See id. at 500.
245. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717, 731 n.12, 732 (Tex. 1995).
246. See id. at 731 n.12.
247. Edgewood V, 176 S.W.3d 746, 787-88 (Tex. 2005) (“The public 
education system need not operate perfectly; it is adequate if districts are reasonably
able to provide their students the access and opportunity the district court 
described.”).
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apply the standard appropriately to the facts in the case. The court 
first dismissed glaring inequities and inadequacies related to 
educational inputs, holding that the adequacy of the system depended 
on outputs.248 Then, after acknowledging glaring achievement gaps 
among minority students and special populations and depressing 
dropout and graduation rates, the court noted slight improvements in 
student scores on the state and national standardized tests, ultimately 
ruling “we cannot conclude that the Legislature has acted arbitrarily 
in structuring and funding the public education system so that school 
districts are not reasonably able to afford all students the access to 
education and the educational opportunity to accomplish a general 
diffusion of knowledge.”249 The court ultimately held the system 
unconstitutional under a separate constitutional provision outlawing 
statewide property taxes, but that led to a remedy that cut property 
taxes but did not necessarily increase access to educational 
opportunities.250
The latest school finance lawsuit filed in Texas may signal 
whether the Texas Supreme Court intends to emphasize the 
importance of providing equal educational opportunities for all 
students. As stated earlier, this case includes a more specific 
challenge to the arbitrary and inadequate funding for at-risk students 
filed by the Edgewood ISD plaintiffs, as well as a claim that the 
system provides inequitable funding for property-poor school 
districts.251 The district court already applied the Edgewood V 
standards to the substantial record evidencing large and growing 
achievement gaps between minority and at-risk students and 
deepening equity gaps between property-poor and property-wealthy 
districts. In its February 4, 2013 ruling, following a three-month trial, 
the state district court held the system unconstitutionally inequitable 
for property-poor districts and inadequate for at-risk students.252 And 
following a three-week evidentiary hearing after reopening of the 
evidence, the trial court again held the system unconstitutional, 
issuing over 350 single-spaced pages of findings—the majority 
highlighting the challenges facing at-risk students and property-poor 
school districts.253
248. See id. at 788.
249. Id. at 789-90.
250. Id. at 794.
251. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
252. See Court’s Ruling, supra note 172, at 2.
253. See Press Release, MALDEF, supra note 173.
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The New York courts’ difficulty with ensuring equal 
educational opportunities through its adequacy ruling resulted largely 
from its deference to the New York legislature. In Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity v. State, a New York supreme court found that the 
State violated the state constitution by failing to provide the 
opportunity for an adequate education to New York City public 
school students and that the public school financing system “had an 
unjustified disparate impact on minority students.”254 But, in the 
same breath, the lower court determined that it would “not at this 
time prescribe a detailed remedy for these violations” and instead 
would give the state legislature the first shot at reforming the 
system.255 Accordingly, the trial court merely directed the state 
legislature to determine “the actual costs of providing a sound basic 
education,” provide transparency in the distribution of school-
funding assistance, and “[e]nsure[] a system of accountability to 
measure whether the reforms implemented . . . actually provide the 
opportunity for a sound basic education.”256 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the New York school financing 
system was unconstitutional but further whittled away at the already 
limited remedy afforded by the trial court.257 Despite plaintiffs’ 
request that the court “initiate a legislative/judicial dialogue by 
issuing guidelines to the Legislature for restructuring the system and 
directing—with strict timetables—that the necessary resources be 
provided,” the Court of Appeals responded by stating that it had 
“neither the authority, nor the ability, nor the will, to micromanage 
education financing.”258 The court then revised the trial court’s 
previous remedy by eliminating the transparency directive and 
limiting the scope of the remedy to New York City public schools, 
instead of schools statewide.259
This general order resulted in a legislative solution that focused 
on increasing funding to schools over a four-year period but was 
stymied after only two years because of budget restrictions caused by 
254. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 549 (Sup. Ct. 
2001). The trial court’s disparate-impact claim was subsequently overturned by the 
appellate division, and that decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 329 (N.Y. 2003).
255. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
256. Id. at 550.
257. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 341, 347.
258. Id. at 344-45. 
259. Id. at 347-48.
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the recession.260 After ten years, New York’s deference to the 
legislature has yielded little opportunity for New York City’s at-risk 
students to receive an adequate education.261 In fact, the legislature’s 
failure to address the constitutional violations led to the filing of a 
new lawsuit in February 2014, alleging that the State of New York 
has failed to adhere to the court’s decisions in the CFE cases and 
continues to deny students in New York their constitutional right to a 
sound basic education.262
Arkansas similarly struggled to effectuate a timely and 
effective remedy to ensure equal educational opportunities through 
adequacy litigation. In Lake View School District No. 25 v. 
Huckabee, plaintiff school districts successfully challenged the 
state’s failure to provide the students of Arkansas with an adequate 
education as guaranteed by the state constitution.263 However, as in 
New York, the Supreme Court of Arkansas hesitated in ordering 
targeted, concrete remedies to address the constitutional deprivation, 
despite plaintiffs’ request for “specific remedies against the State.”264
Moreover, despite the court’s own recognition that the school-
funding system was in “dire need” of change, and despite the court’s 
“considerable frustration” with the state for failing to assume its 
responsibilities with respect to school funding as specified in earlier 
court decisions, ultimately, the court remained steadfast in holding 
that it was not the “court’s intention to monitor or superintend the 
public schools of the state” and essentially left the creation of a 
remedy up to the state.265 In response, the state failed to address the 
adequacy of its school finance system by the court-imposed deadline 
of January 2004.266 In fact, the court recalled its mandate in 2004 and 
260. See Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic 
Education in Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1897 (2012).
261. See Michael A. Rebell, CFE v. State of New York: Past, Present and 
Future, NYSBA GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J., Summer 2011, at 24, 27-28, available at
http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CFE-Past-Present-and-
Future.pdf.
262. See Michael Rebell Files Major New Advocacy Case in New York State,
NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://schoolfunding.info/2014/02/michael-rebell-files-major-new-advocacy-case-in-
new-york-state/.
263. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 495 (Ark. 
2002). 
264. Id. at 507.
265. Id. at 511.
266. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 142 S.W.3d 643, 644 
(Ark. 2004) (per curiam); School Funding Cases in Arkansas, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS 
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again in 2005 to address claims brought by plaintiffs that the state 
was not complying with its constitutional duty to provide an 
adequate education to Arkansas’ school children.267 The court 
appointed special masters to investigate and report on the state’s 
compliance with the court’s orders.268 However, even though the 
court adopted the findings of fact reported by the special masters 
with respect to concrete deficiencies found in the state’s school-
funding system, including that the legislature’s “fr[eezing] the 
categorical funding for 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 for Alternative 
Learning Environment and English Language Learners” would, in 
part, have a “direct impact on remedial and mentoring programs, 
literacy and math coaches, counselors, school nurses, teachers, and 
homework hotlines,”269 the court refused to “direct the General 
Assembly to appropriate a specific increase in foundation or 
categorized funding amounts,” leaving such decisions up to the 
discretion of the legislature.270 Finally, in 2007, based on another 
report issued by special masters appointed by the court, the court 
concluded that the legislature “[had] now taken the required and 
necessary legislative steps to assure that the school children of 
[Arkansas] are provided an adequate education.”271 However, this 
mere determination that the state had taken “the required and 
necessary steps” once again would not prove to be sufficient in 
guaranteeing an adequate education to all Arkansas school 
children.272
NETWORK, http://schoolfunding.info/2011/12/school-funding-cases-in-arkansas/ (last 
updated Dec. 2012). 
267. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 220 S.W.3d 645, 656-57
(Ark. 2005). 
268. Id. at 647.
269. Id. at 656.
270. Id. at 657. 
271. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 257 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Ark. 
2007). 
272. The State of Arkansas is under scrutiny once again as a small rural 
school district filed suit alleging that the state has failed to implement Act 57 of the 
Second Extraordinary Session of the Arkansas Legislature in 2003, which requires 
the Arkansas General Assembly to “assess continually ‘what comprises an adequate 
education in Arkansas’” by “assess[ing], evaluat[ing], and monitor[ing] the entire 
spectrum of public education across the state and . . . evaluat[ing] the amount of 
state funds needed based on the cost of educational opportunity and adequacy.” Lake 
View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 220 S.W.3d at 654 n.4 (quoting H.R. 1111, 84th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2003)). Specifically, the Deer/Mt. Judea 
school district claims that the state knows that such small rural school districts are 
underfunded, but instead of funding them properly, the state seeks to close the 
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Leaving remedies exclusively to the discretion of the state 
entities originally responsible for the constitutional violations, 
especially after repeated violations, often perpetuates the problem of 
unequal educational opportunities. To make matters worse, state 
courts like those in New York and Arkansas failed to ensure that the 
remedies directly address the outstanding violations affecting special 
populations. In places like Arkansas, it is particularly troubling that 
the court hired special masters and adopted their findings as to 
particular areas requiring attention in order for the state to meet the 
constitutional requirement of an adequate education for all school 
children, and yet, the court fails to use this information to craft 
targeted remedies that could prevent repeated trips to the courthouse. 
When courts retreat from targeted remedial orders, they stand 
the risk that state legislatures will fail to address the true disparities 
that keep school finance systems from providing the constitutional 
guarantees of an adequate education to all public school children, 
particularly at-risk students, and worse, that these unaddressed 
disparities will increase the divide between those students receiving 
an adequate education and those left behind—leading to more 
litigation.273 This is why, perhaps, state courts should consider 
conducting fairness hearings to allow various affected students and 
school districts an opportunity to object to a legislative remedy. The 
objectors could still be held to meeting traditional standing 
requirements in order to avoid purely political interests seeking to
delay action; the objectors would need to present evidence and 
argument on why the remedy does not address the constitutional 
violations found previously by the courts. Although this may 
temporarily delay a final solution, given the substantial investment of 
the states and the parties, it may seem like a viable alternative and 
keep the politics of the legislative remedial process more honest and 
open to advocates of at-risk students. 
Nevertheless, even those courts that have deferred remedies to 
state legislatures have recognized that if a state legislature fails to 
schools without considering the effect on a student’s ability to obtain an adequate 
education given the new excessive transportation time. School Funding Cases in 
Arkansas, supra note 266. The Supreme Court of Arkansas overturned the circuit 
court’s decision dismissing the case, and a final decision on the merits remains 
pending. See Deer/Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Kimbrell, 430 S.W.3d 29, 42 (Ark. 2013).
273. N. Carolina Plaintiffs File Major Non-Compliance Motion, supra note
239 (demonstrating that the percentage of at-risk students in North Carolina has
increased over the time period that the state has failed to fulfill its remedial 
commitments).
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remedy constitutional deprivations “or ha[s] consistently shown an 
inability to do so, [then] a court is empowered to provide relief by 
imposing a specific remedy and instructing the recalcitrant state 
actors to implement it.”274 By doing so, courts can help finally 
achieve the equality of educational opportunity promised in Brown 
and the constitutional right to an adequate education for all school 
children, regardless of race or background, as guaranteed by the 
states. 
III. ¿DONDE VAMOS? (WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?)
Many commentators would likely agree that if we had both 
integrated schools and equalized and adequately funded school 
finance systems, achievement and opportunity gaps would close, and
we would be closer to realizing the dream of Brown more than ever 
before.275 Unfortunately, given the current precedents in both school 
desegregation and school finance litigation, that is not likely to 
occur. However, none of the efforts should be abandoned, either.
When a Dallas ISD school principal used English as a second 
language classes as a proxy to segregate Latino and African-
American students in Preston Hollow Elementary School in 2006, it 
was Brown, Hernandez, and the progeny that stopped the within-
school segregation.276 And when the states of Kansas and Texas, 
among others, cut education funding and funded students differently 
based on the zip code they lived in—irrespective of race—it was, 
and will be, the state courts through the state education clauses that 
274. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004).
275. See, e.g., PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST: THE BATTLE FOR ADEQUACY IN 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 1 (2003) (stating that integration and equalized funding 
programs would lead to closing the achievement gaps). 
276. Mayorga Santamaria v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.3:06CV692-
L, 2006 WL 3350194, at *38 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006). Indeed, the court took on 
defendants’ “separate but equal” defense head on, stating: 
Defendants’ conten[d] that no constitutional violation is taking place, 
since non-LEP minority students in ESL classes are receiving an equal 
educational opportunity as non-LEP Anglo students in General Education 
classrooms, because all classes at Preston Hollow follow DISD’s 
mandated curriculum, and the same scope and sequence. The court is 
baffled that in this day and age, Defendants are relying on what is, 
essentially, a “separate but equal” argument. The court cannot help but be 
reminded of the Supreme Court’s decision over one hundred and ten years 
ago in Plessy v. Ferguson . . . . 
Id. 
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restored their rights to an equitable and adequate education for 
impoverished and minority students.277
Both camps must also understand their limitations, while still 
trying to impress upon the courts the importance of their mission to 
equalize educational opportunities. In school desegregation, other 
alternative race-neutral efforts to integrate schools must be 
considered alongside active school desegregation cases where race-
conscious plans are permissible. Although the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the PICS and Louisville cases was a major setback 
undermining school-integration efforts, the Court left open the 
possibility of race-conscious measures.278 Justice Kennedy 
recognized in his concurrence that public school districts have a 
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation and achieving a 
diverse student population.279 Methods specifically endorsed by 
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence included “i. [s]trategic site 
selection of new schools; ii. [d]rawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; iii. [a]llocating 
resources for special programs; iv. [r]ecruiting students and faculty 
in targeted fashions, and v. [k]eeping track of enrollments, 
performance, and other statistics by race.”280
Other efforts may include “[a]mending transfer policies [under 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act]; . . . [l]inking housing 
277. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1. Although 
equity and adequacy cases are, for the most part, discussed in this Article separately, 
there should be no mistake that the preferred method of advocacy is to push for both 
equitable and adequate education in order to arrive closer to Brown’s doorstep. 
Texas, Kansas, Washington, New Jersey, Wyoming, Montana, and Kentucky—
among others—have the precedent to ensure an equitable and adequate education. 
The only question remains whether the right plaintiffs will marshal forward the right 
claims and get the court to enforce a favorable judgment. 
278. Bowman, supra note 81, at 63. But see Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The 
Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial 
Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 277 (2009) 
(“[A]fter Parents Involved, school districts will focus on race-neutral efforts to 
create diverse schools because the decision leaves very little room for racial 
classifications that would survive strict scrutiny. . . . [But] that governments should 
be given wide latitude to adopt race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and 
create diverse schools because these efforts will help school districts accomplish the 
goals of the Equal Protection Clause while avoiding many of the potential harms of 
racial classifications.”).
279. MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
PRESERVING INTEGRATION OPTIONS FOR LATINO CHILDREN: A MANUAL FOR 
EDUCATORS, CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS, AND THE COMMUNITY 5 (2008), available at
http://maldef.org/assets/pdf/6.1.3_Integration.Options.Manual.pdf.
280. Id. at 7.
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mobility programs with educational counseling; and [i]ncreasing 
city-suburban transfer options in metropolitan areas.”281 The National 
Coalition for School Diversity has also urged Congress and the 
Department of Education to consider including diversity as a goal or 
a factor when awarding competitive grants such as Race to the Top, 
expanding charter schools, or supporting magnet schools.282 Still 
others suggest using socioeconomic status as a means to achieve 
more racially diverse schools.283
And while the impact of school finance litigation cases may be 
improved by being tried by those students truly injured and remedied 
more appropriately by the courts as described further above, 
practitioners and advocates must begin to think beyond the box of 
dollars and cents. MALDEF recently filed a promising educational-
opportunity case: Martinez v. New Mexico. The claims marshaled by 
the Martinez plaintiffs, who are comprised of fifty-one parents and 
at-risk public school students, include quantitative and qualitative 
adequacy claims centered on economically disadvantaged, ELL, and 
special education students; substantive due process claims, based on 
the lack of preparation to meet graduation requirements and the lack 
of access to a fundamental sufficient education; equal protection 
claims; claims based on the deprivation of a multicultural education, 
which is part and parcel to a sufficient education; claims calling for 
the monitoring of expenditures for at-risk students; and claims 
targeting teacher evaluations and school-accountability systems that 
are driving quality teachers and administrators away from high-need 
students and schools.284 If successful, the Martinez lawsuit could 
result in the most comprehensive remedy to date.
CONCLUSION
Sixty years following Brown, equal educational opportunities 
remain elusive and achievement gaps remain a grave concern. There 
has been limited progress in both desegregating schools and 
281. FRANKENBERG, LEI & ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 6.
282. See National Coalition on School Diversity: Reaffirming the Role of 
School Integration in K-12 Education Policy, NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY,
http://www.school-diversity.org/full_text.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).
283. Bowman, supra note 81, at 65-70 (acknowledging the limitation of such 
means to integrate in high minority, high poverty school districts).
284. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief,
Martinez v. State, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist. Ct. June 12, 2014),
available at http://www.maldef.org/news/releases/maldef_amends_landmark_
suit_to_address_eo_for_nm_students/. 
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improving educational opportunities through both types of cases. But 
neither school finance litigation nor school desegregation litigation, 
standing alone, was ever meant to close the achievement gaps. The 
fact is that the courts can only do so much in creating opportunities, 
and much more must be done by policymakers, advocates, civil 
rights leaders, educators, and parents—in conjunction with litigation 
when necessary—to prioritize public education and level up the 
playing field so that all students have the opportunity to compete 
fairly and reach their full potential. As Dr. Maria “Cuca” Robledo 
Montecel, president of the Intercultural Development Research 
Association, stated:
Our future depends on us having an excellent public educational system, 
where all students graduate from high school prepared for college or the 
world of work, no matter what the color of their skin, the language they 
speak, or where they happen to be born. And this is a goal I believe we can 
achieve.285
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CONNECT: A QUALITY SCHOOLS ACTION FRAMEWORK (Maria “Cuca” Robledo 
Montecel & Christie L. Goodman eds., 2010).
